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SOMMARIO 
Due componenti ERP, una precoce deflessione negativa (Visual Awareness 
Negativity; VAN), ed una più tardiva deflessione positiva (Late Positivity; LP), si 
suggerisce riflettano proprietà differenti della consapevolezza: rispettivamente, il 
contenuto fenomenico di una percezione e l’accesso allo stesso. 
Il primo esperimento ha indagato la natura graduale o dicotomica della 
consapevolezza. Lo scopo è stato quello di ricercare i correlati neurali di gradi 
differenti di consapevolezza visiva analizzando gli ERP in risposta a stimoli a basso 
contrasto, la cui chiarezza è stata valutata su una scala a quattro punti, la Perceptual 
Awareness Scale (PAS). I risultati hanno identificato una deflessione negativa sulle 
aree centro-parietali sinistre (VAN; picco attorno a 280-300ms), seguita da una 
deflessione positiva bilaterale (LP; ~510-550ms) sulla quasi totalità degli elettrodi. 
Interessante notare che l’ampiezza di entrambe le deflessioni aumentava in maniera 
graduale alla consapevolezza visiva, e che i generatori intracranici del contenuto 
fenomenico (VAN) erano localizzati nel lobo temporale sinistro. I dati suggeriscono 
quindi che la consapevolezza visiva sia caratterizzata da un aumento graduale della 
chiarezza percepita a livello comportamentale e neurale, e che il contenuto percettivo 
emerga da una percoce attivazione locale nelle aree temporali. 
Lo scopo del secondo studio è stato quello di utilizzare un approccio integrato quale 
strumento diagnostico per discriminare tra blindsight e visione degradata conapevole. 
Il blindsight è l’abilità di alcuni pazienti con deficit di campo visivo (emianopia) di 
esibire un comportamento apparentemente guidato dalla vista anche nel loro campo 
cieco, nonostante non riportino consapevolezza degli stimoli. Pazienti con visione 
degradata consapevole, a differenza dei pazienti con blindsight, dovrebbero quindi 
mostrare le stesse componenti ERP (VAN e LP) e la stessa modulazione da parte della 
consapevolezza visiva, come osservato nei soggetti sani. A tal fine, ad una paziente 
emianopica sono stati presentati stimoli nel campo cieco, le è stato richiesto di 
discriminarli e poi di valutarli sulla PAS. A livello comportamentale, la sua 
accuratezza nella discriminazione dipendeva dal livello di consapevolezza, 
suggerendo quindi visione degradata consapevole. I dati elettrofisiologici hanno 
mostrato la presenza precocemente della VAN (picco attorno ai 200ms) e della più 
tardiva LP (da circa 300ms), e, fondamentale, l’ampiezza di entrambe le componenti 
risultava modulata dal livello di consapevolezza. Le componenti elettrofisiologiche 
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possono quindi considerarsi uno strumento diagnostico più fine nella valutazione dei 
pazienti emianopici. 
L’ultimo esperimento mirava a meglio caratterizzare i processi cognitivi riflessi nella 
LP. Non solo è stata infatti associata all’accesso consapevole di un contenuto 
percettivo, ma anche all’accumulazione di evidenza sensoriale che porta alla presa di 
decisione. Per distinguere tra le due interpretazioni, sono stati utilizzati stimoli a livelli 
di contrasto differenti, chiedendo ai partecipanti di discriminarli e poi valutare la 
qualità della loro percezione sulla PAS. I risultati hanno mostrato che la LP era 
modulata solo dalle valutazioni soggettive sulla consapevolezza, e non dai livelli 
differenti di stimolazione sensoriale. I dati suggeriscono che la componente può essere 
considerata uno stadio intermedio tra il puro input sensoriale e la decisione, riflettendo 
il livello di accesso alle rappresentazioni interne, indipendentemente, in parte, 
dall’informazione fisica. Ciò che quindi sembra essere accumulata non è solo 
l’evidenza sensoriale, ma anche il rumore neurale che è indipendente dallo stimolo e 
prodotto all’interno del cervello stesso. 
In generale, si è confermato che consapevolezza fenomenica e di accesso sono 
rispettivamente riflesse nella VAN e nella LP. Inoltre, dal momento che la percezione 
visiva consapevole avviene al di fuori della corteccia visiva primaria, V1 sembra non 
essere necessaria per l’emergere della consapevolezza. 
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ABSTRACT 
Two ERP components, an early negative deflection (Visual Awareness Negativity; 
VAN), and a later positive deflection (Late Positivity; LP) are thought to reflect 
different properties of consciousness: the phenomenal content of a perception and 
access to it, respectively. 
The first experiment investigated the graded vs. dichotomous nature of consciousness. 
The aim was to search for the neural correlates of different grades of visual awareness 
analyzing the ERPs to reduced contrast stimuli, whose clarity was rated on the 4-point 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). Results revealed a left centro-parietal negative 
deflection (VAN; peak at ~280-320ms), followed by a bilateral positive deflection 
(LP; ~510-550ms) over almost all electrodes. Interestingly, the amplitude of both 
deflections gradually increased along with visual awareness and the intracranial 
generators of the phenomenal content (VAN) were located in the left temporal lobe. 
Data thus suggest that visual awareness is characterized by a gradual increase of 
perceived clarity at behavioral and neural level, and that the perceptual content 
emerges from early local activation in temporal areas. 
The aim of the second experiment was to use an integrative approach as a diagnostic 
tool to discriminate between blindsight or degraded conscious vision. Blindsight is the 
ability of some patients with a visual field defect (hemianopia) to exhibit visually 
guided behavior also in their blind field, despite reporting no awareness of stimuli. 
Patients with degraded conscious vision, differently from blindsight patients, should 
thus show the same ERP components (VAN and LP) and the same visual awareness 
modulation observed in healthy subjects. To this end, a hemianopic patient was 
presented with stimuli in her blind visual field, asked to discriminate and then rate 
them on the PAS. At behavioral level, her discrimination accuracy depended on the 
level of awareness, thus suggesting degraded conscious vision. Electrophysiological 
data revealed the presence of the early VAN (peak at ~200ms) and the late LP (from 
~300ms), and, crucially, the amplitude of both components was modulated by the level 
of awareness. Electrophysiological signatures can thus be a fine-grained diagnostic 
tool when assessing hemianopic patients. 
The last experiment aimed at better characterizing the cognitive processes reflected in 
the LP. Not only it has been associated with conscious access to a perceptual content, 
but also with accumulation of sensory evidence leading to decision-making. To 
disentangle between the two, stimuli at different contrast levels were presented, asking 
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participants to perform a discrimination task and then rate the quality of their 
perception on the PAS. Results showed that the LP was modulated only by the 
subjective ratings of awareness, and not by the different levels of sensory stimulation. 
Data suggest that the component can be considered an intermediate stage between 
merely sensory input and decision, reflecting the level of access to internal 
representation, partly regardless of the physical information. What thus appears to be 
accumulated is not only sensory evidence, but also stimulus-independent neural noise 
produced within the brain itself. 
Overall, phenomenal and access consciousness were confirmed to be distinctly 
reflected in the VAN and LP. Moreover, since conscious visual perception occurs 
outside the primary visual cortex, V1 appears not to be necessary for the emergence of 
awareness.  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Consciousness has always been and continues to be a difficult topic in neuroscience 
research, even if it can be considered the most essential feature that characterizes our 
mental life. Due to the complexity of the theme, different classifications and 
definitions of consciousness have been offered throughout the years, each of them 
focusing on a specific aspect of it. In a recent review (de Graaf et al., 2102), four 
different distinctions of consciousness have been proposed. The first definition is about 
Self-awareness, referring to all mental aspects that define our experience as being 
‘someone’ different from ‘others’. Then there is Higher-order awareness, a feature 
that differentiates humans from other animals and allows us to reflect on things. The 
comparison between the states of being conscious (e.g. awake) and of not being 
conscious (e.g. sleeping or comatose) is reflected in the so-called Medical awareness. 
Finally and more interestingly to our research, Content-Consciousness is the actual 
phenomenal quality present in the mind of a subject that is consciously experiencing 
something.  
The main goal of all studies on content-consciousness is to look for its neural correlates 
(NCCs), defined as those neural processes that are necessary and sufficient to generate 
a conscious experience (Koch, 2004). The NCCs are usually investigated by 
comparing identical physical conditions leading or not to a conscious percept (Baars, 
1998). Significant achievements in this field of research have been possible also thanks 
to the investigation of some peculiar neuropsychological syndromes (e.g. blindsight, 
agnosia or spatial neglect) occurring in brain-damaged patients (Naccache, 2015), 
where crucial dissociations can be observed. However, different experimental 
paradigms yielded different results on the brain regions involved in conscious 
perception: from striate and extrastriate areas (Block, 2005), to higher-level 
extrastriate regions projecting to the prefrontal cortex (Crick and Koch, 1995, but see 
also Koch et al., 2016) or a widespread fronto-parietal network (Dehaene and 
Naccache, 2001). In summary, no satisfactory and unitary conclusion on the NCCs has 
been reached yet, and the debate is still vividly open. 
Another important issue in the study of consciousness regards the measures used to 
investigate it. Methodologically speaking, in cognitive neuroscience (and every other 
science that demands to be defined “experimental”), the primary source of evidence 
should be obtained from objective data, with an almost complete neglect of subjective 
reports, often considered unreliable. However, the same argument cannot be fully 
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applied to the study of consciousness, a concept that by definition is intrinsically 
related to a temporally specific and subjective experience. In this case, in fact, 
objective measures often raises some problems (Schurger and Sher, 2008), mostly 
resulting in an overestimation of the perceptual experience and an inability to capture 
some peculiar and more elaborated aspects of perception. For this reason, recently, 
subjective reports (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004; Del Cul et al., 2007) have been 
preferred, since they allow to assess consciousness immediately after every trial 
presentation, thus being a more accurate representation of the internal state 
experienced by the experimental subjects (for a comparison between different report 
scales, see Overgaard and Sandberg, 2012). 
Taken together, these considerations highlight the need of designing experimental 
studies that combine different measures (objective/behavioral, subjective and also 
brain-based data) to better investigate and appreciate the composite concept that is 
consciousness. As regards brain-imaging techniques, recording the 
electrophysiological brain signals (EEG) and more specifically analyzing the event-
related potentials (ERPs; Luck, 2005) proved to be an excellent tool to examine the 
temporal evolution of brain’s activity in response to specific sensory or cognitive 
events (for a review on conscious perception-related ERPs see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 
2010).  
The aim of the works presented in the following chapters was thus to use an integrative 
approach in order to investigate consciousness, specifically visual awareness and its 
different properties, in both healthy and brain-damaged subjects. 
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EXPERIMENT 1 
 
This chapter has been published as a scientific paper: 
“Tagliabue, C.F., Mazzi, C., Bagattini, C., and Savazzi, S. (2016). Early local activity in temporal 
areas reflects graded content of visual perception. Frontiers in Psychology, 7, 572” 
 
1. Introduction 
Consciousness (or awareness) refers to the fact that, when we are awake, we have 
experiences. Since consciousness gained enough consideration to be investigated in 
the field of cognitive neuroscience, an intensive search for the neural correlates of 
consciousness (NCC) has been undertaken. The NCC has been defined by Koch (2004) 
as “the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms jointly sufficient for a specific 
conscious percept”. 
Such NCC are usually investigated by contrasting neural responses to physically 
identical stimuli that are consciously perceived or not, the so-called contrastive 
analysis (Baars, 1988), used across different experimental paradigms in which visual 
awareness is manipulated (e.g. masking, change blindness, reduced-contrast stimuli, 
etc. For a review, see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010). fMRI studies have revealed that 
changes in conscious contents correlate with activation along the ventral visual 
pathway (e.g. Bar et al., 2001; Pins and ffytche, 2003) with additional involvement of 
frontal and parietal areas (e.g. Beck et al., 2001; Lumer and Rees, 1999), revealing the 
key role of dorsal-ventral interactions for visual awareness. The temporal dynamics of 
such neural processing have been obtained by studying event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs), the electrical potential changes in response to a given sensory, motor or 
cognitive event (Luck, 2005). Recent ERP studies have found that conscious 
perception consistently correlates with an early component called Visual Awareness 
Negativity (VAN; Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003), that is a negative amplitude 
difference wave between aware and unaware trials peaking at about 200 ms after 
stimulus onset in occipito-temporal sites (Koivisto et al., 2008), but also observed at 
central, fronto-polar (Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004) and occipital-parietal (Pitts et al., 
2014) electrodes. The latency of this component is prolonged (up to 200 ms later) when 
the contrast of the stimuli is lowered (Ojanen et al., 2003). The VAN is usually 
followed by a later positive component, called Late Positivity (LP; Del Cul et al., 
2007), another difference wave between aware and unaware conditions peaking 
between 300 and 400 ms after stimulus presentation in parietal and central sites. 
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Finally, weaker evidence has been found also for an enhancement of P1 amplitude in 
response to aware trials at around 100-130 ms in the occipital sites (Pins and ffytche, 
2003), even if this early positive component might better reflect attention-related 
processes (Hillyard et al., 1998).  
Importantly, it has been proposed (Block, 2005) that a distinction needs to be made 
between two components of consciousness:  phenomenal consciousness, described as 
the “what-it-is-like” of the experience (the actual content), and access consciousness, 
that is the ability to report, remember or act on such experiences. Accordingly, 
different NCC might reflect each one of these components (Block, 1996). Following 
the classification made by Block, Koivisto and Revonsuo (2010) have proposed that 
the two components typically found in ERP experiments to correlate with visual 
awareness (VAN and LP) may represent distinctive NCC of the different properties of 
consciousness. More specifically, given their latencies and topographies, the VAN, the 
earlier ERP component, has been interpreted (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) as the 
neural correlate of phenomenal awareness, whereas the LP, the later ERP component, 
has been related to access awareness. 
Together with the classification of consciousness in the phenomenal and the access 
components, another important issue that has to be taken into account when 
investigating visual awareness relates to the way the perceptual experience is reported. 
Studies on unconscious perception typically require the participants to report whether 
or not they saw a stimulus, thus measuring their conscious experiences in a 
dichotomous way (e.g. Baars, 1994). In this perspective, then, consciousness is 
considered as an all-or-none process. However, it has been argued that conscious 
perception is a complex phenomenon characterized by different degrees of clarity, thus 
needing more elaborated report measures to be adopted (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 
2004).  
In the light of these considerations, in order to obtain more detailed subjective reports 
Ramsøy and Overgaard (2004) developed a 4-point scale to assess the clarity of 
perceptual experiences: the Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS). The four points 
consistently used by the participants to judge their visual perceptions were: 1) no 
experience of the stimulus, 2) brief glimpse, 3) almost clear experience and 4) clear 
experience. The PAS proved to be the most exhaustive measure of visual awareness 
compared to other graded scales and showed a good correlation between performance 
and awareness, possibly implying that different cognitive processes actually take place 
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for each level of the scale (Sandberg et al., 2010). The four categories of the PAS thus 
refer to the quality of the perceptual experience, differently from confidence ratings 
that mostly involve metacognitive knowledge about the perceptual content (see 
Sandberg et al., 2010 for a comparison of report methodologies). 
Accordingly, an fMRI study (Christensen et al., 2006) investigated the neural 
correlates of the use of a three-point scale (clear, vague, no perceptual experience) to 
rate the clarity of visual experiences in response to briefly presented stimuli. 
Interestingly, the authors revealed that different levels of awareness correlated with 
different degrees but also with different patterns of brain activation. More specifically, 
reports of clear experiences activated a network including parietal, temporal, frontal, 
basal ganglia and thalamic areas, while reports of vague perception resulted in graded 
activation within the same network but also in specific activations in frontal and insular 
regions, not seen for reports of clear experiences. Also a recent MEG study (Andersen 
at al., 2015) found that, during a visual masking task, occipital sources in the VAN 
time range were more accurate in decoding visual awareness as assessed on the four 
categories of the PAS, providing further evidence that perceptual awareness may be 
best described as a graded phenomenon. 
So far, just a few papers have used a graded scale to assess visual awareness using 
EEG. The most evident limitation is that not all the categories of the scale were actually 
investigated. For example, Melloni and colleagues (2011) studied how previous 
experience affected conscious perception of stimuli presented at different degradation 
levels. Participants had to rate target visibility on the PAS, but then the authors decided 
to recode the scale into a dichotomous scale and found that P200 amplitude was 
inversely modulated by perceptual awareness. More recently, in another study 
Koivisto and colleagues (2013) focused on the role of recurrent interactions for 
categorization of natural scenes and the PAS was used in an object substitution 
masking experiment. However, due to the small number of ‘no experience’ ratings, 
behavioral analyses were carried out by pooling together the ratings of the two lowest 
PAS categories (‘no experience’ and ‘brief glimpse’), showing how reduced 
perceptual awareness following masking affected categorization performance. 
Moreover, ERPs were investigated only for masked and unmasked trials, regardless of 
PAS rating. The situation is more complex when even a more fine-graded continuous 
scale is used to evaluate subjective visibility by moving a cursor on a horizontal bar 
where only the extremes are labeled (‘not seen’ and ‘maximal visibility’). Such a scale 
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was employed in an attentional blink (Sergent et al., 2005) and in a masking (Del Cul 
et al., 2007) experiment; for both tasks the authors found that visibility ratings could 
be neatly divided into two categories, seen and not seen trials, without intermediate 
graded ratings, thus showing a sort of nonlinear trend for visual awareness.  
It thus seems clear that the difficult part is to get enough trials for each category of the 
scale, in order to perform analyses on all of them. 
The aim of the present study is to explore the possible neural correlates of different 
grades of visual awareness. To do so, we studied the ERPs in response to reduced 
contrast visual stimuli at a detection threshold of about 50%. Participants had to judge 
the brightness of the stimuli and then qualitatively rate their visual experiences on the 
four-point PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). It was hypothesized that different 
grades of awareness may be reflected by different amplitudes of the components 
related to conscious perception (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003; Del Cul et al., 2007; 
Pins and ffytche, 2003). More specifically, if consciousness is indeed a graded 
phenomenon, then a linear increase of the amplitudes of the components should be 
observed as a function of visual awareness. Furthermore, from the analysis of the 
intracranial generators we could draw some conclusions on where visual awareness 
emerges in the brain. 
 
2. Materials and methods 
2.1 Participants 
Twenty right-handed participants (13 females, mean age ± standard deviation: 22.5 ± 
2.11) were recruited for the study. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision 
and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They all gave their written 
informed consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the local 
Ethics Committee and conducted in accordance with the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki. 
Data from six participants were excluded because there were not enough trials for 
analysis (<40 trials per condition) or because they showed an unequal distribution of 
the two stimulus types (lighter and darker) in one or more conditions. Two participants 
were not included in the study because of persistent noise in the EEG signal. The final 
sample was thus composed of twelve participants (11 females, mean age ± standard 
deviation: 23.08 ± 2.06).  
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2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were two-dimensional lighter or darker gray Gaussian patches with a 
standard deviation of 0.5°, presented for 34 ms on a gray background (8.01 cd/m2) at 
an eccentricity of 7° along the vertical meridian and of 12° along the horizontal 
meridian to the right of the fixation point. Two stimulus luminance values (one lighter 
and one darker than the background) were determined for each participant by means 
of a threshold assessment procedure: during this phase five different lighter luminance 
values (ranging from 6.65 cd/m2 to 7.60 cd/m2) and five different darker luminance 
values (ranging from 8.69 cd/m2 to 9.77 cd/m2) were used.  
 
2.3 Threshold Assessment 
In a dimly lit testing room participants sat in front of a 17 in. CRT monitor (resolution 
1024 x 768, refresh rate of 85 Hz) placed at a viewing distance of 57 cm, with their 
head laying on a chin rest. The aim was to find two individual luminance values (one 
lighter and one darker) at which the participants reported to be aware of about 50% of 
the stimuli. The detection threshold was measured using the method of constant stimuli 
(Urban, 1910), where the preselected luminance values were presented in a 
randomized order in the periphery of the right visual field (see “Stimuli” section for 
details). The procedure included ten blocks: on each block, each luminance value was 
tested five times, resulting in a total number of 500 trials per participant. On each trial 
the stimulus appeared after a random interval (300–600 ms) following a brief 1000 Hz 
warning tone. The participants were asked to keep their eyes on a central fixation cross 
and press the spacebar whenever they saw a stimulus. At the end of the threshold 
assessment one lighter luminance value and one darker luminance value related to a 
50%-detection threshold were chosen for each participant. These two luminance 
values were then used in the second phase of the experiment. 
 
2.4 EEG Experiment 
Each trial started with a black fixation cross, followed 400 ms later by a 1000 Hz 
warning tone. After a random interval ranging from 200 to 600 ms a lighter or a darker 
gray Gaussian patch (whose luminance values were determined in the threshold 
assessment) was presented for 34 ms in the periphery of the right visual field. A 1000 
ms pause was then followed by a response prompt asking the participants to judge the 
brightness of the stimulus as compared with the gray background, pressing a button 
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for “lighter” and another button for “darker”. The participants were required to answer 
even if they did not see any stimulus. Then another response prompt asked the 
participants to rate the quality of their perception on the four-point Perceptual 
Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). The four PAS categories are: 
0) no experience of the stimulus, 1) a brief glimpse, meaning that the participant saw 
something but could not discriminate the brightness of the stimulus, 2) an almost clear 
experience and 3) a clear experience. Responses were given by pressing four different 
buttons on the keyboard (Fig. 1A). In order to verify that the participants used the PAS 
properly, at the end of the experiment we administered an open-ended questionnaire 
asking them to describe the criteria used for each category of the scale. The 
experimental session was divided into twenty blocks (66 trials each: 30 lighter, 30 
darker and 6 stimulus-absent trials), thus yielding a total of 1320 trials. The order of 
the trials was fully randomized. Both the threshold assessment and the EEG 
experiment were programmed and run using E-prime (Psychology Software Tools, 
Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA; https://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm). 
 
2.5 EEG recording and event-related brain potential (ERP) analysis 
EEG signal was continuously recorded with BrainAmp system (Brain Products GmbH, 
Munich, Germany – BrainVision Recorder) using a Fast'n Easy cap with 27 Ag/AgCl 
pellet pin electrodes (EasyCap GmbH, Herrsching, Germany) placed according to the 
10–20 International System (O1, O2, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, CP5, CP1, CP2, CP6, T7, C3, 
Cz, C4, T8, FC5, FC1, FC2, FC6, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, Fp1, Fp2). Four additional 
electrodes were used for monitoring blinks and eye movements. Horizontal and 
vertical eye movements were detected respectively with electrodes placed at the left 
and right canthi and above and below the right eye. Other two extra electrodes served 
as ground (AFz) and online reference (right mastoid, RM). All scalp channels were 
then re-referenced offline to the left mastoid (LM). Electrode impedances were kept 
below 5 kΩ. The digitization rate was 1000 Hz with a time constant of 10 s as low cut-
off and a high cut-off of 250 Hz.  
The continuous EEG signal was then processed off-line using Brain Vision Analyzer 
2.0. Data were filtered with a high-frequency cutoff of 50 Hz (12 dB/octave) and a 
low-frequency cutoff of 0.1 Hz (12 dB/octave), and a 50 Hz notch filter was used to 
remove 50 Hz interference. Channels Fp1 and Fp2 were removed in all participants 
due to excessive noise. Independent component analysis (ICA) was applied to the 
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whole dataset using the Infomax ICA algorithm (Bell and Sejnowski, 1995) in order 
to eliminate artefactual ICs. The EEG data were then cut into epochs of 1200 ms 
starting 200 ms before the onset of the stimulus and segmented trials were baseline 
corrected on the 200 ms pre-stimulus period. Before averaging, all segments were 
visually inspected and removed if contaminated by eye movements, blinks, strong 
muscle activity or excessive noisy EEG. The averaging was carried out for five 
different conditions: PAS = 0 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving a rating of 0 
on the PAS), PAS = 1 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving a rating of 1 on the 
PAS), PAS = 2 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving a rating of 2 on the PAS), 
PAS = 3 (correct lighter and darker trials receiving a rating of 3 on the PAS) and Catch 
(stimulus-absent trials receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS). After pre-processing, the 
mean number of trials used for the average was 103 for PAS = 0, 75 for PAS = 1, 88.25 
for PAS = 2, 65.92 for PAS = 3 and 57.83 for the Catch condition. Finally, for 
statistical analysis, data were downsampled to 250 Hz. 
 
2.6 Statistical analysis 
A repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was carried out on the mean 
percentage of correct responses of each level of the PAS. A non-parametric binomial 
test was performed on the same measures to determine whether accuracies were 
significantly different from chance (50%). 
Each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2 and 3) was pairwise compared to the 
unconscious (PAS = 0) condition with the Mass Univariate ERP Toolbox (Groppe et 
al., 2011) implemented in Matlab by means of repeated measures, two-tailed t-tests on 
consecutive mean amplitude time windows of 20 ms, from 0 to 1000 ms at all electrode 
sites. For the three pairwise comparisons (PAS = 1 vs PAS = 0; PAS = 2 vs PAS = 0; 
PAS = 3 vs PAS = 0) the classic Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) false discovery rate 
(FDR) control procedure was applied with an FDR level of 5%.  
Other two repeated-measures ANOVAs were then conducted in order to test whether 
the increment in amplitude of the VAN and the LP as a function of perceived clarity 
was linear. To do so, we evaluated by means of the trend analysis implemented as part 
of the analysis performed by the ANOVA in SPSS, whether a linear or nonlinear 
(quadratic or cubic) function best represented data distribution by using polynomial 
coefficients. The first ANOVA was performed on the mean amplitude of the 
significant 20 ms time window (280–300 ms, VAN time range) of each level of the 
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PAS for electrodes Cp5 and T7 separately (selected on the basis of the previous 
analysis). The second ANOVA was run on the mean amplitude of a significant 40 ms 
time window (510–550 ms, LP time range) of each level of the scale for electrode Pz 
only (selected according to the literature). 
The generators contributing to the different levels of awareness as assessed on the PAS 
were defined using Scalp Current Density (SCD) maps, as implemented in BrainVision 
Analyzer 2.0. SCD maps are calculated from the Laplacian second derivative of the 
field potential that is directly proportional to the current density. This technique is 
independent from the reference electrode and mathematically eliminates the voltage 
gradients caused by tangential current flows, thus emphasizing the local contributions 
to the surface maps and providing a better visualization of approximate locations of 
intracranial generators. SCD topographic maps were computed from the spherical 
spline interpolation of the surface voltage recording (Perrin et al., 1989) for each 
conscious-unconscious difference. A fourth-order spherical spline was used with a 
spline-smoothing coefficient (λ) of 1×10-6. In order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio 
and to account for inter-individual differences, SCD maps were created on the grand 
averages of the differences between each conscious condition (PAS = 1, PAS = 2, PAS 
= 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0). As a result of the three pairwise 
comparisons, SCD analyses were performed on the VAN (280-300 ms) and LP (510–
550 ms) time windows. The display gain of the maps was defined by visually 
inspecting the baseline period of the SCD maps (from −200 to 0 ms) to better 
appreciate the contribution of noise to the SCD topographies. 
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Figure 1. Trial procedure and results: (A) Experimental procedure: first, a fixation cross was 
presented for 400 ms followed by a warning acoustic tone lasting 150 ms. Then, a random 
interval ranging from 200 to 600 ms preceded the stimulus presentation (34 ms) in the 
periphery of the right visual field. After a 1000 ms pause participants had to discriminate the 
brightness of the stimulus (Discrimination task) and then rate the clarity of their perception on 
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the PAS (Awareness task). (B) Behavioral results: mean percentage of correct responses for 
each level of the PAS. Error bars represent standard errors and the solid line (50%) chance 
level. (C) ERPs: grand average ERPs in response to each category of the PAS and catch trials 
for electrode Cp5. Gray dotted boxes indicate the components of interest (respectively VAN 
and LP). (D) Single subject behavioral data. The thick black line represents the mean of 
accuracy. (E) Single subject amplitudes of the VAN component as a function of the differences 
between each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2 and 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 
0). The thick black line represents the average of single subject amplitudes. (F) Single subject 
amplitudes of the LP component as a function of the differences between each conscious 
condition (PAS = 1, 2 and 3) and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0). The thick black line 
represents the average of single subject amplitudes. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Behavioral results 
After the threshold assessment, the mean luminance value chosen for lighter trials was 
of 9.23 cd/m2 and of 7.23 cd/m2 for darker trials. The mean percentage of catch trials 
receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS was 92.10% (sd = 5.19), thus revealing the reliability 
of the participants. For all trials, the mean percentage of PAS = 0 responses given by 
the participants was 42.66%, for PAS = 1 was 22.66%, for PAS = 2 was 22.88% and 
for PAS = 3 was 11.78%. A repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on the mean 
percentage of correct responses for each category of the PAS showed that, as visual 
awareness increased, also accuracy significantly increased [F(3,33) = 156.46, p < 0.01; 
linear trend F(1,11) = 1279.817, p < 0.01]. The mean percentage of correct responses 
for PAS = 0 was 51.15%, for PAS = 1 was 72.82%, for PAS = 2 was 85.68% and for 
PAS = 3 was 95.81% (Fig. 1B). Interestingly, also at the single subject level this linear 
trend could be observed (Fig. 1D), both for included and excluded (data not shown) 
participants. Finally, a non-parametric binomial test performed to determine whether 
the accuracy of each PAS level significantly differed from chance (50%) revealed that 
the performance when PAS = 1, PAS = 2 and PAS = 3 was significantly above chance 
level (all ps < 0.01), while for PAS = 0 it was not different from 50% (p > 0.05).  
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3.2 ERP results 
Visual inspection of the grand average ERPs of each category of the PAS confirmed 
the presence of an early negative deflection (VAN) peaking at 300 ms at left channels 
followed by a later bilateral positive deflection (LP) starting at ~400 ms (Fig. 1C). 
To compare each conscious condition (PAS = 1, PAS = 2, PAS = 3) with the 
unconscious condition (PAS = 0) we analyzed the corresponding mean amplitudes by 
means of the Mass Univariate analysis (Groppe et al., 2011) in consecutive time 
windows of 20 ms, starting from 0 to 1000 ms after stimulus onset, at all electrodes. 
For the PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0 pairwise comparison all significant FDR-corrected p-
values were between 0.049056 and 0.001173 (Fig. 2A), for PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0 
between 0.049848 and 0.000320 (Fig. 2B) and for PAS = 3 versus PAS = 0 between 
0.047111 and 0.000040 (Fig. 2C). 
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Figure 2. Raster plots: FDR-controlled t-test from Mass Univariate analyses of the three 
comparisons between each conscious (PAS = 1, 2 and 3) condition and the unconscious (PAS 
= 0) condition. T-tests were performed on the mean amplitude of consecutive time windows 
of 20 ms. (A) PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0. (B) PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0. (C) PAS = 3 versus PAS 
= 0.  
 
3.2.1 Visual Awareness Negativity (VAN) 
In the VAN time range (~280-300 ms) the first conscious-unconscious pairwise 
comparison performed on PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0 conditions demonstrated that the 
ERP amplitudes differed significantly at electrodes T7 and Cp5 in the left hemisphere, 
contralateral to stimulus presentation (Fig. 2A). The two-tailed t-tests of the second 
pairwise comparison on PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0 conditions revealed a significant 
difference again at left electrodes T7 and Cp5 but also at electrode P7 (Fig. 2B). 
Finally, the two-tailed t-tests on PAS = 3 versus PAS = 0 conditions showed similar 
results to those obtained in the previous comparisons: the VAN effect was broader 
both in terms of time and number of significant electrodes (P7, P3, Cp5, Cp1, C3, T7, 
Fc1 and Fc5), spreading to left centro-parietal sites, as depicted in Fig. 2C  
To test whether there was a linear increase in the amplitude of the VAN components, 
two repeated-measures analyses of variance were carried out for electrodes T7 and 
Cp5 on the mean amplitudes of each level of the PAS in the significant 20 ms time 
window (280-300 ms). We decided to choose these two channels since both of them 
resulted significant in all the three conscious-unconscious pairwise comparisons in the 
VAN time range. The two ANOVAs showed that for both electrodes the amplitude of 
the VAN increased as a function of visual awareness (T7: F(3,33) = 16.299, p < 0.01; 
Cp5: F(3,33) = 19.435, p < 0.01). Interestingly, the analyses revealed a linear 
modulation in the increase of both electrode amplitudes (T7: linear trend F(1,11) = 
34.858, p < 0.01; Cp5: linear trend F(1,11) = 54.263, p < 0.01) and such linear trend 
was evident in the data of each participant (Fig. 1E). 
Conscious conditions thus seemed to elicit more negative responses than the 
unconscious condition, as revealed by the presence of a reliable negative early 
component (VAN). The component peaked between 280 and 300 ms and was evident 
at left lateral posterior channels spreading to more parietal and central sites as visual 
awareness increased. Moreover, there was a linear graded modulation of the amplitude 
of the component as a function of the levels of visual awareness. 
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3.2.2 Late Positivity (LP) 
Corresponding pairwise comparisons were performed in the LP time window. The 
two-tailed t-tests on PAS = 1 versus PAS = 0 conditions showed a widespread LP 
component starting at ~420 ms post-stimulus and continuing until the end of the epoch 
(1000 ms), particularly over posterior and central sites, bilaterally (Fig. 2A). The 
comparison performed on PAS = 2 versus PAS = 0 conditions revealed a widespread 
LP component that started at ~360 ms and continued up to 1000 ms showing the most 
consistent effects bilaterally at posterior, central and partly also at prefrontal channels 
(Fig. 2B). Finally, the two-tailed t-tests on the last conscious-unconscious comparison 
performed on PAS = 3 versus PAS = 0 found significant differences between the two 
conditions starting at ~340 ms to 1000 ms over all channels bilaterally (Fig. 2C).  
One repeated-measures ANOVA was performed for electrode Pz on the mean 
amplitudes of each level of the PAS in a 40 ms time window around the peak (510-
550 ms) in order to test for a linear increase of the LP component. Given the 
widespread LP effect, channel Pz was chosen for analysis according to the literature 
(Del Cul et al., 2007). As for the VAN, the ANOVA revealed that the amplitude of the 
LP linearly increased with higher ratings of visual awareness (F(3,33) = 70.277, p < 
0.01; linear trend F(1,11) = 103.177, p < 0.01) and this linear modulation was again 
found at the individual level, as shown in Fig. 1F.  
Responses to perceived trials were thus more positive than to unconscious trials. Such 
broad LP effect was bilaterally evident at central, posterior and lateral sites spreading 
also to prefrontal channels as visual awareness increased. Finally, the amplitude of the 
LP component was linearly modulated by visual awareness. 
 
3.2.3 Scalp Current Density (SCD) Maps 
Intracranial generators of the VAN and the LP were defined using SCD maps (Fig. 3). 
According to the SCD topographies, at the lowest level of visual awareness (PAS = 1), 
the VAN component was consistent with left temporal generators, contralateral to 
stimulus presentation. The effect then spread to left posterior parietal areas at the 
intermediate level of awareness (PAS = 2) and finally activated a complex comprising 
also fronto-central generators at the highest level of conscious perception (PAS = 3). 
As regards the LP effect, the SCD topographies were consistent with bilateral 
posterior, lateral and central generators for the lowest and intermediate levels of visual 
awareness (PAS = 1 and PAS = 2), while for reports of clear experience (PAS = 3), 
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current density foci were observed over different scalp areas including the prefrontal 
cortex and seemed larger in the right hemisphere. The intracranial generators of the 
phenomenal awareness (as assessed by the VAN) were thus found in the left temporal 
lobe, then the activation spread to posterior, central and prefrontal areas as a function 
of visual awareness. The LP component, interpreted to reflect access awareness, 
originated bilaterally in posterior, lateral and central areas extending to prefrontal 
regions as perceived clarity increased.  
 
 
Figure 3. SCD topographic maps: SCD foci for the VAN (upper panel; time window from 
280 to 300 ms) and LP (lower panel; time window from 510 to 550 ms) components performed 
on the grand average of the differences between each conscious condition (PAS = 1, 2 and 3) 
and the unconscious condition (PAS = 0). 
 
4. General Discussion 
In the present study, participants were required to rate the clarity of their perceptual 
experience of low-contrast stimuli on the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale 
(Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). We found that their discrimination accuracy increased 
linearly as visual awareness increased. Moreover, ERP results revealed two 
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electrophysiological components correlating with visual awareness. A negative early 
deflection, the VAN, peaking around 280-300 ms at lateral, parietal and central sites 
in the left hemisphere, followed by a later positive component, the LP, starting 
bilaterally 400 ms after stimulus onset over different scalp regions. As for accuracy, 
the amplitude of both components was found to increase linearly as a function of visual 
awareness as assessed on the PAS. 
These results provide evidence that visual perceptual experience is characterized by a 
gradual increase of perceived clarity at both behavioral (accuracies) and neural 
(amplitudes) level. Such findings seem to be inconsistent with those by Del Cul (2007), 
in which both accuracies and subjective ratings collected on a continuous scale where 
only the extremes were labelled exhibited a nonlinear dichotomous distribution and 
the P300 was the only component whose amplitude varied with a similar sigmoidal 
trend to subjective ratings. The authors thus concluded that the P300 reflected the final 
stage of a process that led to an all-or-none reportability of a perceptual experience 
and they seem to allude to what Block (2005) defined “access consciousness”. 
However, it has been argued that the components in the P300 latency range and, thus, 
access consciousness might better reflect post-perceptual processes or consequences 
of consciousness, such as the confidence of the observer (Eimer and Mazza, 2005), 
different levels of accumulation of sensory evidence (Melloni et al, 2011) or working 
memory update (Polich, 2007). Given that the PAS is a measure of clarity of the 
perceptual experience and not a measure of confidence in response accuracy, our data 
would suggest that the LP might reflect the linear increase of the sensory evidence as 
the clarity of perceptual experience increases, in line with the interpretation given by 
Melloni and colleagues (2011). 
Importantly, what proved to be the earliest most reliable correlate of phenomenal 
consciousness (Block, 2005), across different experimental paradigms and attentional 
manipulations, is the VAN, interpreted (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) as the correlate 
of the actual content of perception as opposed to later post-perceptual processes (for a 
review see Railo et al., 2011). In agreement with this interpretation, the quality 
judgments given by our participants on the PAS were reflected in a concurrent linear 
modulation of the VAN amplitude, showing that different levels of cortical activity 
determined different levels of perceptual clarity. Similar results were found by 
Moutoussis and Zeki (2002) that showed how the difference between perceived and 
invisible stimuli depended on the strength of brain activation. 
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Our results are in line with findings obtained with different neuroimaging techniques. 
In an fMRI study (Christensen et al., 2006), reports of vague perceptual clarity versus 
clear experiences resulted in graded brain activity but also in unique patterns of cortical 
activation. As regards MEG, a recent experiment (Andersen et al., 2015) showed that 
occipital sources at the time window of the VAN could better decode graded levels of 
perceptual consciousness as assessed on the PAS. Taken together, all these pieces of 
evidence seem to support the graded nature of visual experience. Moreover, given its 
early latency, the VAN seems to be the component that better tackles the different 
degrees of perceived clarity of the phenomenal content.  
An important point that deserves some considerations relates to the “where in the 
brain” perceptual awareness emerges. Our study, together with previous studies (e.g. 
Koivisto et al., 2013; Sandberg et al., 2013a), seems to indicate that processes 
correlating with the graded contents of visual experience take place in temporal areas. 
The presence of early generators (VAN) in such posterior areas might be in line with 
data on phosphene perception (Bagattini et al., 2015): in this paper, the authors have 
proved how phosphene perception following occipital TMS stimulation is generated 
in the temporal cortex, while phosphene perception after parietal stimulation arises 
from the parietal regions. The fact that different generators have actually been found 
for the two different stimulation conditions thus confirms that the temporal and parietal 
cortices themselves are independent generators of conscious visual percepts. Both 
these and our results seem to be in favor of Zeki’s “micro-consciousness” proposal 
(Zeki and ffytche, 1998), stating that local early activity in higher-order extrastriate 
regions plays a key role in generating visual perception. Indeed, it is evident from the 
analysis of intracranial sources that visual consciousness does not require a later 
widespread fronto-parietal activation, as proposed by the Global Workspace Theory 
(GWT; Dehaene, 2014). This, again, is confirmed by phosphene studies (Bagattini et 
al., 2015), since a patient with a complete lesion of V1 showed differences for 
phosphene awareness only in an early time window, unlike healthy participants where 
differences were found also in a later phase in occipital and frontal areas. Likewise, 
recent MEG findings (Andersen et al., 2015) revealed that frontal sources at the P300 
time range could not decode all PAS ratings. All these results seem to strengthen the 
assumption that such later frontal activity might support those consequences of 
consciousness (LP or access consciousness; Block, 2005) that are related to the 
components in the P300 time window (confidence, Eimer and Mazza, 2005; 
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accumulation of sensory evidence, Melloni et al, 2011; update of working memory, 
Polich, 2007) and not perceptual awareness itself.  
Another interesting aspect is that the PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004) proved to 
be a good report measure to investigate different levels of perceptual clarity. Indeed, 
in the present study participants could use all the categories of the scale. Besides, we 
found that different levels of accuracy, and both the access properties (LP) and, more 
importantly, the actual phenomenal content of consciousness (VAN) differed 
depending on the levels of the PAS further corroborating the suggestion (Ramsøy and 
Overgaard, 2004) that each judgment given by the participants actually implies 
differences in processing. The implications related to such findings are important when 
considering blindsight patients. Blindsight follows a lesion in the primary visual 
cortex, resulting in a preserved ability to detect and discriminate visual stimuli 
presented in the blind field yet reporting no awareness of them: a phenomenon at first 
described as a case of unconscious vision (Weiskrantz, 1986). The exact mechanisms 
that are responsible for blindsight are still unknown but some patients with a huge 
lesion of V1 have been reported to exhibit some residual visual consciousness in their 
damaged hemifield (Barbur et al., 1993; Zeki and ffytche, 1998). The use of a graded 
scale, such as the PAS, together with electrophysiological measures, might be helpful 
in discriminating patients showing a genuine blindsight phenomenon from those 
having residual conscious vision. In fact, using a dichotomous scale might not be 
sufficient to detect weaker forms of conscious perception, as already illustrated by 
Overgaard and colleagues in their seminal paper (2008) and more recently by Mazzi 
and colleagues (submitted). In these studies, patient GR (Overgaard et al, 2008) and 
patient SL (Mazzi et al., submitted), both suffering from a damage to the left occipital 
lobe, exhibited a blindsight behavior when tested with a binary seen/unseen scale, 
while when using the PAS, visual awareness was predictive of their performance, thus 
exhibiting conscious, yet degraded, vision. It could, thus, be predicted that patients 
diagnosed with degraded vision (as assessed on the PAS or another graded scale) 
would show similar components (VAN and LP) as the healthy participants in the 
present paper while genuine blindsight patients would not. 
To summarize, we found that discrimination performance in a task with low-contrast 
stimuli increased as a function of visual awareness together with a linear amplitude 
modulation of the components correlating with the perceptual content (VAN) and post-
perceptual processes (LP), suggesting that the nature of visual consciousness might be 
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gradual. We also propose that the conscious phenomenal content of perceptual 
experiences emerges from the activation in temporal areas, as indicated by the 
topography of the intracortical generators of the VAN. Finally, the PAS seems to be 
an exhaustive measure in order to obtain more detailed subjective ratings. 
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EXPERIMENT 2 
 
1. Introduction 
Hemianopia is one of the most common visual field defects that follows a lesion 
occurring between the optic chiasm and the primary visual cortex (Holmes, 1945). In 
particular, in homonymous hemianopia the patient has no conscious access to visual 
information presented in his contralesional hemifield, despite of absence of peripheral 
damage to the eye.  
Interestingly, even if there is no visual awareness for material appearing in the 
contralesional visual field, some of the patients suffering from hemianopia can show 
some striking behavior that seems to be visually guided (Weiskrantz, 2009). Such a 
phenomenon is called ‘blindsight’ (Weiskrantz et al., 1974). For example, patients can 
above chance orient their attention to stimuli presented in their blind visual field, 
without being utterly aware of them (Sanders et al., 1974). Noteworthy, since not all 
hemianopic patients exhibit blindsight, different neuroanatomical correlates have been 
related to this particular behavior. Some authors linked blindsight to the preserved 
functioning of “islands” of neurons within the damaged visual cortex (Fendrich et al., 
2001), even if this account has not been completely confirmed. Other studies (Rodman 
et al., 1989) support the existence of a subcortical pathway projecting from the superior 
colliculus and the pulvinar towards extrastriate areas in the dorsal stream. Lastly, 
recent researches (Schmid et al., 2010) identified the lateral geniculate nucleus of the 
thalamus as a crucial structure in visual functions, necessary for neural activation of 
extrastriate areas in the absence of V1. No clear consensus on the neural basis of 
blindsight has been reached yet, also due to the fact that over the last years, alongside 
the original form of blindsight (later called type 1 blindsight), another variety of such 
a behavior has been described in a series of experiments, the so-called type 2 blindsight 
(Weiskrantz, 1998). In type 2 blindsight, patients report a “non-visual” feeling of 
something happening in the blind field, thus showing a residual awareness that 
positively correlates with the behavioral outcome in visual tasks (e.g. Stoerig and 
Barth, 2001; Zeki and ffytche, 1998). However, it has been claimed (Foley, 2014) that 
patients exhibiting type 2 blindsight might describe their perceptual experiences as 
non-visual in nature because, as a consequence of the brain damage, they lack the 
important features that specifically characterize healthy visual perception. So what 
might happen is that patients misjudge the visual nature of the perceptual experience, 
31 
 
since it is extremely different from what it used to be before the lesion. If this is the 
case, then, type 2 blindsight, differently from type 1 blindsight, can be better described 
as degraded yet conscious vision. 
Another important issue when studying blindsight regards the assessment of residual 
visual abilities in hemianopic patients. In fact, blindsight has usually been studied by 
means of dichotomous report scales (e.g. Azzopardi and Cowey, 1997), requiring the 
patients to say whether or not they perceived something in their blind visual field. In a 
methodological review on blindsight, Overgaard (2011) stated that conscious 
experiences are indeed complex, so that binary scales have a too limited capacity to 
detect weaker forms of consciousness. This is true especially in the case of hemianopic 
patients where, as said before, the visual experience is completely different from that 
of neurologically healthy subjects. As a confirm, studies on two different hemianopic 
patients (GR: Overgaard et al., 2008; SL: Mazzi et al., 2016) found that, when using 
binary scales, such patients put the threshold for visual awareness higher than when 
they were required to use graded measures. These different thresholds result in a 
blindsight behavior when awareness is assessed through dichotomous scales (i.e. 
above chance performance in the absence of conscious experience), and in degraded 
conscious sight when using graded scales (i.e. performance positively correlates with 
visual awareness level). It obviously follows that exhaustive rating scales should be 
employed to assess residual visual abilities in hemianopic patients, in order not to over 
or underestimate the visual defect. Particularly, the scale that was used to test the 
aforementioned patients (GR and SL), and proved to be an exhaustive measure of 
visual awareness, is the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy and 
Overgaard, 2004). In addition, electrophysiological data showed that each level of the 
scale differentially modulated the amplitude of two ERP components (the Visual 
Awareness Negativity and the Late Positivity) related to conscious perception, and, 
specifically, the amplitude of both components resulted to be linearly modulated by 
the level of visual awareness as rated by the participants on the scale (Tagliabue et al., 
2016). The combined use of the PAS and electrophysiological measures could thus be 
a promising approach to discriminate patients exhibiting an authentic blindsight 
behavior from those suffering from just degraded conscious vision. Patients with 
degraded vision, in contrast to genuine blindsight patients, might not only have a 
behavioral performance that positively correlates with visual awareness, but also show 
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similar VAN and LP components (and a similar modulation) as those  found in healthy 
subjects. 
The aim of this study is to test a female hemianopic patient (SL), that was previously 
reported (Mazzi et al, 2016) to suffer from degraded conscious vision assessed at 
behavioral level. The same assessment procedure was repeated: the patient was 
presented with stimuli in her blind visual field, asked to first discriminate them and 
then rate the quality of her perceptual experience on the PAS. In addition, while SL 
performed the task, the EEG signal was recorded in order to investigate the ERP 
components and their hypothesized modulation elicited by the material showed in her 
blind hemifield. The ultimate goal is to evaluate whether electrophysiological 
signatures can act as an additional and more fine-grained diagnostic tool to confirm 
the behavioral performance exhibited by patients.  
 
2. Materials and Methods 
2.1 Participant 
The patient involved in the study is a 49-years old right-handed woman (SL). She 
suffered from an ischemic stroke with hemorrhagic evolution that completely 
destroyed her left primary visual cortex (V1), as shown by the MRI (Fig. 1A). A right 
homonymous hemianopia developed as a consequence of the brain damage and was 
assessed through a computerized perimetry (Humphrey system; Fig 1B).  
 
 
Figure 1. (A) Axial MRI slices showing SL’s lesion in the left occipital lobe. (B) Visual field 
plots obtained from computerized Humphrey perimetry that surveys ± 30 degrees for the left 
(L) and right (R) eye. The black region shows the hemianopic right visual field. 
 
SL was tested about 88 months after the neurological event. The patient gave her 
written informed consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the 
local Ethics Committee and conducted in accordance with the 2013 Declaration of 
Helsinki. 
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2.2 Stimuli 
The stimuli were two-dimensional lighter or darker gray circles with a diameter of 4°, 
presented for 72 ms on a gray background (7.47 cd/m2). The stimuli were presented 
unilaterally in the blind (right) visual field of the patient, at an eccentricity of 7° along 
the vertical meridian and of 12° along the horizontal meridian. Two stimulus 
luminance values (one lighter, 10.46 cd/m2, and one darker, 0.27 cd/m2, than the 
background) were chosen to perform the task. 
 
2.3 Experimental Procedure 
In a dimly lit testing room the patient sat in front of a 17-inc CRT monitor (resolution 
1024 x 768, refresh rate of 85 Hz) placed at a viewing distance of 57 cm, with her head 
laying on an adjustable chin rest. Each trial started with a black central fixation cross, 
followed 400 ms later by a 1000 Hz warning tone lasting 150 ms. A random interval 
ranging from 200 to 600 ms to avoid expectation preceded stimulus presentation. 
Lighter or darker gray circles were then presented for 72 ms in the periphery of the 
blind (right) visual field. A 1000 ms pause was then followed by a response prompt 
asking the patient to judge the brightness of the stimulus as compared with the gray 
background, pressing a button for “lighter” and another button for “darker”. Stimulus-
absent (catch) trials were also included in the experiment and SL was required to guess 
when no stimulus discrimination was possible. Then another response prompt asked 
her to rate the quality of her perception on the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale 
(PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). The four PAS categories are: 0) no experience 
of the stimulus, 1) a brief glimpse, meaning that the participant saw something but 
could not discriminate the brightness of the stimulus, 2) an almost clear experience 
and 3) a clear experience. Responses were given by pressing four different buttons on 
the keyboard (Fig. 2).  
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Figure 2. Single trial structure: A fixation cross was presented for 400 ms followed by a 
warning acoustic tone lasting 150 ms. Then, a random interval preceded the stimulus 
presentation (72 ms) in the periphery of the (blind) right visual field. After a 1000 ms pause 
SL had to discriminate the brightness of the stimulus (Discrimination task) and then rate the 
clarity of her perception on the PAS (Awareness task). 
 
In order to avoid misunderstandings, the use of the PAS was thoroughly discussed with 
the patient in a training session (Sandberg et al., 2013b). The experimental session was 
divided into 30 blocks (33 trials each: 15 lighter, 15 darker and 3 stimulus-absent 
trials), thus yielding a total of 990 trials. The order of the trials was fully randomized. 
The EEG experiment was programmed and run using E-prime (Psychology Software 
Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA, USA; https://www.pstnet.com/eprime.cfm). To control 
SL’s fixation during the presentation of the stimuli, her eye movements were 
monitored on-line throughout the experiment by means of an infrared camera. 
 
2.4 EEG recording and event-related brain potential (ERP) analysis 
EEG signal was continuously recorded with BrainAmp system (Brain Products GmbH, 
Munich, Germany – BrainVision Recorder) using a Fast'n Easy cap with 59 Ag/AgCl 
pellet pin electrodes (EasyCap GmbH, Herrsching, Germany) placed according to the 
10–05 International System. Four additional electrodes were used for monitoring 
blinks and eye movements. Horizontal and vertical eye movements were detected 
respectively with electrodes placed at the left and right canthi and above and below the 
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right eye. Other two extra electrodes served as ground (AFz) and online reference 
(right mastoid, RM). Electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ. The digitization 
rate was 1000 Hz with a time constant of 10 s as low cut-off and a high cut-off of 250 
Hz. The continuous EEG signal was then processed off-line using EEGLAB (Delorme 
and Makeig, 2004). First of all, data were downsampled to 250 Hz and then filtered 
with a low-frequency cutoff of 0.1 Hz. A 50 Hz bandpass notch filter (width of 2 Hz) 
was also applied to remove 50 Hz line noise. All scalp channels were then re-
referenced offline to the left mastoid (LM). Independent component analysis (ICA) 
was applied to the whole dataset using the Infomax ICA algorithm (Bell and 
Sejnowski, 1995) in order to eliminate artefactual ICs (e.g. eye blinks, saccades, 
muscle activity). After ICA, a high-frequency filter with a cut-off of 40 Hz was 
applied. The EEG data were then cut into epochs of 1300 ms starting 300 ms before 
the onset of the stimulus and segmented trials were baseline corrected on the 300 ms 
pre-stimulus period. Before averaging, all segments were visually inspected and 
removed if contaminated by residual eye movements, blinks, strong muscle activity or 
excessive noisy EEG. Due to the fact that SL never used rating 3 on the PAS, the 
averaging was carried out for four different conditions only: PAS = 0 (correct lighter 
and darker trials receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS), PAS = 1 (correct lighter and 
darker trials receiving a rating of 1 on the PAS), PAS = 2 (correct lighter and darker 
trials receiving a rating of 2 on the PAS) and Catch (stimulus-absent trials receiving a 
rating of 0 on the PAS). After pre-processing, the number of trials used for the average 
was 104 for PAS = 0, 129 for PAS = 1, 102 for PAS = 2 and 59 for the Catch condition.  
 
2.5 Statistical analysis 
A non-parametric binomial test was performed on the mean percentage of correct 
responses of each level of the PAS to determine whether accuracies were significantly 
different from chance (50%). 
For the analysis of the ERPs, each category of the PAS (0, 1 and 2) was compared to 
the others by means of a non-parametric Monte Carlo percentile two-tailed bootstrap 
resampling procedure (Efron and Tibshirani, 1993), on each sample (channel x time 
point) from 0 to 800 ms after stimulus onset. Bootstrap relies on random sampling with 
replacement, so that each new sample is not identical to the initial one. 10,000 
resampled data distributions were created and a 0.05 significance threshold was used. 
Correction for multiple comparisons was performed through the classic Benjamini and 
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Hochberg (1995) false discovery rate (FDR) control procedure, with an FDR level of 
5%. Before running the analysis, the order of the trials was shuffled within each 
condition, due to the fact that they had slightly different numbers of trials. 
Furthermore, the maximum size of each resampled distribution was equated to the size 
of the less numerous condition. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Behavioral Results 
The percentage of stimulus-absent trials receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS was 93.3%, 
thus revealing how SL can most of the times recognize when nothing is presented in 
her blind field. For all trials collapsed across color, the mean percentage of PAS = 0 
responses given by the patient was 29.78%, 46.33% for PAS = 1 and 23.89% for PAS 
= 2. She never used rating 3. The mean percentage of correct responses when SL used 
PAS = 0 was 59.33%, 46.76% when trials were rated 1 and 66.98% when she reported 
an almost clear experience of the stimulus (PAS = 2). A non-parametric binomial test 
was performed to determine whether the accuracy of each PAS category was 
significantly different from chance level (50%). The analyses found that the 
performance when PAS = 0 and PAS = 1 did not differ from 50% (all ps > 0.05), while 
for PAS = 2 it was significantly above chance level (p < 0.01; Fig. 3).  
 
 
Figure 3. Behavioral results: mean percentage of correct responses for each level of the PAS. 
The solid line represents (50%) chance level. 
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The behavioral data thus revealed that, even if SL gave different ratings about her 
perceptual experience, there is no difference in accuracy between PAS = 0 and PAS = 
1 (they are both at chance level), while her performance is above 50% when she reports 
a clearer visual experience (PAS = 2). 
 
3.2 ERP results 
The visual inspection of SL’s averaged ERPs (Fig. 4) elicited by each category of the 
PAS confirmed the presence of an early negative deflection, consistent with the VAN, 
peaking around 200 ms over left channels. The VAN is followed by a later bilateral 
positive deflection, consistent with the LP, starting at ~300 ms. 
 
Figure 4. ERPs: grand average ERPs in response to each category of the PAS and catch trials 
for electrode Cp5. Gray dotted boxes indicate the components of interest (respectively VAN 
and LP). 
 
Each condition (PAS = 0, PAS = 1, PAS = 2) was compared to the others by means of 
FDR-corrected boostrap tests on the amplitude of each time point, starting from 0 to 
800 ms after stimulus onset, over all electrodes. In the first comparison, PAS = 0 versus 
PAS = 1, no sustained reliable difference was found between the two PAS conditions, 
for both VAN and LP (Fig. 5). 
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Figure 5. Raster plot of FDR-controlled bootstrap t-tests of PAS = 0 versus PAS = 1 
comparison. T-tests were performed on the amplitude of each time point, from 0 to 800 ms 
after stimulus onset. 
 
The second comparison between PAS = 1 and PAS = 2 (Fig. 6) showed the first 
significant sustained difference for a negative component consistent with the VAN 
starting around 150 ms until 210 ms, over left temporal, central and frontal areas (T7, 
FT7, FC5, FC3, F7, F5). As regards the LP, a significant difference is found from 
around 250 to 300 ms after stimulus onset over left posterior and centro-parietal 
channels (O1, PO7, PO3, P7, P5, P3, P1, CP5, CP3, CP1, FC1), while over central and 
right centro-parietal electrodes the difference is significant from around 270 until 500 
ms after stimulation (FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz, POz; P2, P4, P6, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8, C2, 
C4, C6, T8, FC2, FC4, FC6, FT8). 
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Figure 6. Raster plot of FDR-controlled bootstrap t-tests of PAS = 1 versus PAS = 2 
comparison. T-tests were performed on the amplitude of each time point, from 0 to 800 ms 
after stimulus onset. The black box indicates the electrodes where a difference in the VAN is 
observed, while the red boxes indicate the electrodes where a difference in the LP is observed. 
 
The last comparison between PAS = 0 and PAS = 2 (Fig. 7) identified a significant 
difference in the VAN over centro-parietal sites (P7, P5, TP7, CP5, CP3, T7, C5, C3, 
FT7, FC5, FC3), from around 170 to 230 ms after stimulus onset, while significant 
differences on the LP were observed bilaterally over the majority of electrodes, starting 
from 250 until 530 ms. 
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Figure 7. Raster plot of FDR-controlled bootstrap t-tests of PAS = 0 versus PAS = 2 
comparison. T-tests were performed on the amplitude of each time point, from 0 to 800 ms 
after stimulus onset. The black box indicates the electrodes where a difference in the VAN is 
observed, while the red box indicates the electrodes where a difference in the LP is observed. 
 
 
The results thus identified no differences in the VAN and LP when comparing the two 
lowest levels of visual awareness (PAS = 0 vs PAS = 1). Significant differences were 
instead found in the other comparisons (PAS = 1 vs PAS = 2 and PAS = 0 and PAS = 
2), with higher amplitudes of both components related to higher levels of perceptual 
visual experience. 
 
4. General Discussion 
In the present study, we tested SL, a hemianopic patient previously (Mazzi et al., 2016) 
assessed at behavioral level and showing degraded conscious vision. The patient was 
furtherly tested in her blind visual field while recording the EEG signal. She was 
required to discriminate visual stimuli and then rate the clarity of her perceptual 
experience on the four-point Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 
2004). We found that her visual defect was confirmed as degraded conscious vision. 
Not only she could use 3 out of the 4 possible PAS categories (no experience, brief 
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glimpse and almost clear experience), but, more crucially, her discrimination accuracy 
depended on the level of awareness. Moreover, ERP results revealed the presence of 
the VAN, peaking around 200 ms after stimulus onset in the left hemisphere, and the 
LP, starting bilaterally at 250 ms over different scalp sites. As found in healthy subjects 
(Tagliabue et al., 2016), the amplitude of both VAN and LP was larger for higher 
levels of visual awareness, again confirming the conscious nature of her visual 
perception in the blind field. 
These data highlights the usefulness of ERP analysis as an additional tool to graded 
scales in the assessment of hemianopic patients, in order to disentangle between 
genuine unconscious vision (blindsight) and degraded yet conscious vision. Despite 
the absence of significant differences at the neural level between PAS = 0 and PAS = 
1, the electrophysiological data are in line with the discrimination accuracy of SL. In 
fact, for both PAS = 0 and PAS = 1 her discrimination accuracy is not different from 
chance (50%). The degraded visual input is thus not strong enough to allow SL an 
above chance performance when rating her perceptual experience as brief glimpse 
(PAS = 1), contrary to what was seen in healthy subjects (Tagliabue et al., 2016). This 
again confirms the absolute differences existing between visual perceptions generated 
by a healthy visual field and by an impaired visual field (Foley, 2014), leading to the 
necessity to go beyond binary assessing scale that are not able (Overgaard et al., 2008; 
Mazzi et al., 2016) to catch every aspect of a complex visual experience. 
Of great interest, despite the complete destruction of the primary visual cortex 
confirmed also by fMRI (Celeghin et al., 2015), SL could indeed perceive visual 
stimuli presented in her blind field. Moreover, these results show a behavior that is 
different from the classical Riddoch syndrome (Riddoch, 1917), where patients report 
to be aware of moving stimuli in their blind visual field. In fact, SL reported almost 
clear experiences for static stimuli. Our present data, together with other findings (see 
for example Mazzi et al., 2014; Bagattini et al., 2015), are in line with the view that 
considers primary visual cortex and feedback to it not the only gateway to conscious 
vision (ffytche and Zeki, 2011). Even more intriguingly, the visual stimuli presented 
in SL’s blind hemifield could elicit electrophysiological responses in the damaged 
hemisphere. Activations in the damaged hemisphere has been previously shown 
(Rossion et al., 2000) while presenting complex stimuli (faces and cars), even if the 
patient tested in that study (GY) exhibited no awareness of them. In this respect, some 
studies on patients with visual field defects have reported that extrastriate areas 
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(Goebel et al., 2001; Bridge et al., 2010), especially area MT, and the lateral 
intraparietal cortex (Silvanto, 2014) show residual activation even in the absence of a 
functioning V1, therefore they might be still capable of at least low-level visual 
functions. Consequently, a residual activation of spared cortical areas might lead to an 
impaired but conscious visual perception. However, no general agreement has been 
reached on which is the area or the network of cortical and subcortical areas that, in 
the absence of V1, subserves such a conscious visual behavior (for a review, see 
Silvanto, 2015), and the present data cannot be in favor of any of the proposed 
alternative explanations. 
In sum, we found that a hemianopic patient, described (Mazzi et al., 2016) as having 
degraded conscious vision when tested with visual stimuli presented in her blind 
hemifield, shows ERP signatures that are consistent with her behavior. In fact, the 
amplitude of both the VAN and the LP is larger when the patient reports an almost 
clear visual experience. Even if a larger sample is needed to confirm the present 
findings, our data speaks in favor of an integrative approach, comprising graded scales 
of visual awareness and concurrent EEG recording, when assessing residual vision in 
patients suffering from hemianopia. 
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EXPERIMENT 3 
 
1. Introduction 
Since its discovery (Sutton et al., 1965), the P300, a large centro-parietal positive 
deflection peaking within a varying time window spanning from 250 to 500 ms after 
stimulus onset, has been the focus of many debates on its functional significance. Due 
to the fact that the P300 is modulated by different stimulus manipulations (for a review, 
see Polich, 2007), a clear general agreement about the cognitive process it represents 
has not been reached yet. Among the various proposals it has been suggested to reflect 
context updating (Donchin and Coles, 1988), closure of perceptual events (Desmedt, 
1981), allocation of attentional resources (Wickens et al., 1983) or stimulus evaluation 
(Kutas et al., 1977). 
Lately, in the research field on perceptual decisions, a new interesting theory on the 
cognitive function of the P300 has been put forward. O’Connell and colleagues, in a 
series of studies (O’Connell et al., 2012; Kelly and O’Connell, 2013; Loughnane et al., 
2016), identified a component in the P300 latency range they called Centro-Parietal 
Positivity (CPP) and suggested it to be the neural correlate of a so-called “decision 
variable”. Such a decision variable is not the correlate of the decision itself, but rather 
an integration of different signals that must be decoded in order to trigger the actual 
decision (Shadlen and Kiani, 2013). In line with this view, the CPP build-up rate 
increases steadily as a function of the incoming sensory evidence strength and peaks 
at response time (O’Connell et al., 2012). Moreover, within the same level of sensory 
stimulation, not only the build-up rate of the component is steeper when associated 
with faster reaction times (RTs), but also pre-target α power, an index of attentional 
endogenous fluctuations (Thut et al., 2006) inversely correlated with cortical 
excitability, appears to be larger for slower RTs. The authors thus claimed that the 
evolution of the CPP, in relation to accumulated sensory evidence and RTs, shows 
how decision formation is influenced by a combination of exogenous physical factors 
and fluctuations within the brain itself. 
Interestingly, another cognitive process that has been associated with the P300 is the 
so-called “access awareness” (Block, 2005). According to Block’s distinction, access 
awareness is the ability of the subjects to act, report or remember the phenomenal 
content of a given perceptual experience and experiments investigating visual 
awareness (for a review, see Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) links access awareness to 
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a component called Late Positivity (LP; Del Cul et al., 2007). The LP is a positive 
difference wave between aware and unaware trials, peaking between 300 and 400 ms 
after stimulus onset in centro-parietal sites. The LP not only discriminates between 
seen and unseen conditions, but its amplitude is also modulated by different levels of 
visual awareness (Tagliabue et al., 2016), as rated by subjects on the four-point 
Perceptual Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). However, also the 
actual cognitive underpinnings of the LP as a post-perceptual process still remain 
unclear (Railo et al., 2011; Rutiku et al., 2015; Salti et al., 2012).  
Taken together, these findings highlight the striking resemblance between the CPP and 
the LP. Both components share the same polarity (positive), latency (peak around 300 
– 400 ms after stimulus presentation) and topography (centro-parietal). However, they 
are suggested to reflect different cognitive processes, thus not solving the confusion 
about the actual functions represented by such a positive component peaking at 300 
ms after stimulation (the P300 component): does it more closely reflect accumulation-
to-bound of sensory evidence (as indexed by the CPP in perceptual decision-making 
studies) or conscious access to the content of the perception (as indexed by the LP in 
visual awareness experiments)? Crucially, it is unavoidable that awareness and 
accumulation of sensory evidence are intrinsically linked and confounded, since the 
more the accumulated evidence, the higher the level of awareness about the presented 
information. Nevertheless, the main issue is that decision-making experiments are 
usually designed with stimuli providing different levels of sensory information (such 
as different percentages of motion coherence or contrast), taking for granted that each 
level yields a given subjective percept (i.e. targets containing more sensory 
information are always better processed and perceived than trials with fewer sensory 
information), without assessing how the participants really perceive the stimuli. On 
the other hand, visual perception experiments follow the logic of contrastive analysis 
(Baars, 1988), according to which the neural correlates of consciousness should be 
investigated by contrasting neural responses to consciously perceived or unperceived 
physically identical stimuli. As a consequence, by using stimuli with the same amount 
of sensory information, what visual awareness studies lack is an investigation of the 
contribution of external stimulation in generating the perceptual experience. 
A possible solution to fill the gaps of both literatures is to combine different conditions 
of visual awareness and sensory stimulation, in order to get a clearer idea 1) about 
which of the two factors is mainly reflected in the P300 and then 2) about what or if 
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there is a differential contribution from physical stimulation and access to internal 
representations in perceptual tasks. 
In this respect, it might be hypothesized that the P300 is part of a two-stage (Carpenter 
et al., 2009) decision process. The first stage (detection) detects signals among noise 
until reaching a predetermined threshold through a random walk, consistent with a 
diffusion model account (Ratcliff and Rouder, 2000). The output of this first stage is 
integrated into the second stage (decision), where more higher order factors determine 
a linear rise to threshold, consistent with the LATER (Linear Approach to Threshold 
with Ergodic Rate) approach (Carpenter, 1999). As a consequence, this two-stage 
model explains behavioral variability as resulting not only from the noise accumulated 
together with sensory stimulation during the first stage, but also from the noise that is 
generated within the brain itself during the second stage. We might hypothesize that 
the P300 acts as an intermediate phase between merely sensory input and the decision, 
thus representing stimulus-independent internal processes. To test this hypothesis and 
to overcome the limitations of both the sensory-evidence approach (that usually 
dismisses subjective experience) and the awareness approach (where no manipulation 
of sensory information is employed), we designed an EEG experimental paradigm 
where stimuli at different contrast levels were presented, asking participants to perform 
a discrimination task and then rate the quality of their perception on the four-point 
PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). Our paradigm, thus, allowed us to investigate 
the modulation of the P300 for each experimental manipulation alone (sensory 
evidence and access awareness), while holding constant the orthogonal manipulation 
(awareness for sensory evidence and sensory evidence for awareness, respectively).  
 
2. Materials and Methods  
2.1 Participants 
14 participants (7 females, 2 left-handed, mean age ± standard deviation: 23.79 ± 3.17) 
were recruited for the study. All reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. They all gave their written informed 
consent to participate in the study. The study was approved by the College of Science 
and Engineering Ethics Committee of the University of Glasgow and conducted in 
accordance with the 2013 Declaration of Helsinki. Data from three participants were 
excluded from the analysis because of a low number of trials in one or more conditions. 
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The final sample was thus composed of 11 participants (6 females, 1 left-handed, mean 
age ± standard deviation: 23.6 ± 3.32).  
 
2.2 Experimental Procedure 
The experiment comprised two sessions performed within two consecutive days. The 
first session served for threshold assessment (see “Threshold Assessment”) and to 
familiarize participants with the behavioral task. During the second session, after a 
threshold re-assessment, participants were prepared for EEG recordings. They then 
performed a forced choice discrimination task while the EEG was continuously 
recorded (see “EEG Experiment”). 
 
2.3 Stimuli  
The stimuli were two-dimensional light or dark gray Gaussian patches with a standard 
deviation of 0.65°, presented on a gray background, at an eccentricity of 5° along the 
vertical meridian and of 10° along the horizontal meridian to the right of the fixation 
point. Six stimulus luminance values (three lighter and three darker than the 
background) were determined for each participant by means of a threshold assessment 
procedure (see next paragraph for further details). The contrast luminance of the 
stimuli presented varied from 0.025 to 0.116% of the maximal luminance of the 
brightest (white) and of the darkest (black) colour. 
 
2.4 Thresholds Assessment 
In a dimly lit testing room participants sat in front of a CRT monitor (resolution 1280 
× 1024, refresh rate of 100 Hz) placed at a viewing distance of 57 cm, with their head 
laying on a chin rest. The aim of the assessment session was to individually identify 
six luminance values (three for light and three for dark patches) corresponding to 25%, 
50% and 75% of correct detection. The thresholds were measured using the method of 
constant stimuli (Urban, 1910). At the beginning of the assessment procedure, ten 
evenly spaced luminance values ranging from 0.025 to 0.116% of the maximal black 
and maximal white screen luminance were presented in a randomized order, in the 
periphery of the right visual field (see “Stimuli” for details). This first phase included 
two blocks: on each block, all luminance values were tested seven times together with 
14 stimulus-absent trials (catch trials), resulting in a total number of 308 trials per 
participant. On each trial the stimulus appeared after a 1000 ms interval following a 
47 
 
brief (150 ms) 1000 Hz warning tone. Participants were asked to keep their eyes on a 
central fixation cross and press the spacebar whenever they saw a stimulus. At the end 
of the two blocks, data of both light and dark stimulus trials were separately fitted to a 
sigmoid function and contrast values yielding detection thresholds of 25%, 35%, 50%, 
65% and 75% were extracted for each participant. The contrast levels extracted were 
then tested again in two blocks, including 10 trials for each contrast and stimulus type 
(light and dark stimuli) and 14 catch trials, resulting in a total number of 228 trials per 
participant.  
On the second day of testing and prior to EEG recording, a short threshold assessment 
was performed, to verify that participants’ performance was comparable to that 
obtained in the first session. In this case, the contrast values previously identified (5 
for light and 5 for dark patches) and contrast levels corresponding to 0% and 100% 
detection accuracy were each presented seven times together with 14 catch trials, for 
a total of 182 trials. If luminance values resulting in detection thresholds of about 25%, 
50% and 75% were confirmed, they were selected for the behavioural task during the 
EEG recording. Otherwise, data were once again fitted to a sigmoid function and new 
contrast levels were extracted and tested with the same procedure. The assessment 
procedure had to be repeated for 4 subjects.  
 
2.5 EEG Experiment 
During EEG, participants performed a two-alternative forced choice discrimination 
task. Each trial (Fig. 1) started with a black fixation cross, followed 400 ms later by a 
1000 Hz warning tone (150 ms). After a 1000 ms interval, a light or a dark gray 
Gaussian patch (whose luminance values were determined in the threshold assessment) 
was presented for 30 ms (3 frames) in the periphery of the right visual field. A 1000 
ms blank was then followed by a response prompt asking the participants to judge the 
brightness of the stimulus as compared with the gray background, pressing a button 
for “lighter” and another button for “darker”. The participants were required to answer 
even if they did not see any stimulus. After the button press, another response prompt 
asked participants to rate the quality of their perception on the four-point Perceptual 
Awareness Scale (PAS; Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004).  
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Figure 1. Single trial structure: A fixation cross was presented for 400 ms followed by a 
warning acoustic tone lasting 150 ms. Then, a 1000 ms interval preceded the stimulus 
presentation (30 ms) in the periphery of the right visual field. After a 1000 ms pause 
participants had to discriminate the brightness of the stimulus (Discrimination task) and then 
rate the clarity of their perception on the PAS (Awareness task).    
 
The four PAS categories are: 0) no experience of the stimulus, 1) a brief glimpse, 
meaning that the participant saw something but could not discriminate the brightness 
of the stimulus, 2) an almost clear experience and 3) a clear experience. Responses 
were given by pressing four different buttons on the keyboard. The experimental 
session was divided into ten blocks. Each block was composed of 80 trials: 10 trials 
for each individually adjusted stimulus contrast (25%, 50% and 75% of detection 
threshold) and stimulus type (light and dark), together with 20 catch trials, thus 
yielding a total of 800 trials. The order of the trials was fully randomized. Both the 
threshold assessment and the actual behavioral task were programmed and run in 
MATLAB (MathWorks Inc.), using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 
1997; Pelli, 1997). 
 
2.6 EEG recording and Event-Related Brain Potential (ERP) Analysis 
EEG signal was continuously recorded with BrainAmp system (Brain Products GmbH, 
Munich, Germany – BrainVision Recorder) using a Fast'n Easy cap with 61 Ag/AgCl 
pellet pin electrodes (EasyCap GmbH, Herrsching, Germany) placed according to the 
10–05 International System. An additional electrode was positioned on the outer 
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canthus of the left eye to record eye movements (after being referenced to Fp1), 
whereas horizontal eye movements were detected by referencing  AF7 to AF8 off-line. 
Two extra electrodes served as ground (TP9) and on-line reference (AFz). All scalp 
channels were re-referenced off-line to the average of all electrodes. Electrode 
impedances were kept below 10 kΩ. The digitization rate was 1000 Hz with a time 
constant of 10 s as low cut-off and a high cut-off of 100 Hz.  
The continuous EEG signal was pre-processed off-line using Brain Vision Analyzer 
2.0 (BrainProducts). Data were filtered with a second order high-frequency cutoff of 
85 Hz and a second order low-frequency cutoff of 0.1 Hz. A band rejection filter with 
a bandwidth of 2 Hz was then used to remove 50 Hz interference. Independent 
component analysis (ICA; Bell and Sejnowski, 1995) was applied to remove eye blinks 
and muscle artifacts. The EEG data were then cut into epochs of 1300 ms starting 300 
ms before the onset of the stimulus and baseline corrected to 300 ms pre-stimulus 
period. All segments were visually inspected and removed if still contaminated by 
residual eye movements, blinks, strong muscle activity or excessive noisy EEG. On 
average, ~5% of the trials were discarded. Finally, for statistical analysis, data were 
down-sampled to 250 Hz before averaging. 
Analysis of the Event-Related brain Potentials (ERPs) was performed using the 
Fieldtrip toolbox (Oostenveld et al., 2011; see 
http://www.ru.nl/neuroimaging/fieldtrip). Averaging was carried out separately for 
each Contrast and Rating condition. To evaluate the unique impact of visual awareness 
on P300, we randomly selected trials within the same PAS rating so that the average 
would include an equal number of trials with different contrast stimuli, in order to 
control for the contrast factor. In a second analysis, we focused on the impact of 
physical properties of the stimuli, i.e. different contrasts, on P300. In this case, within 
the same contrast, trials were randomly selected so that the average would include an 
equal number of trials receiving different perceptual ratings on the PAS, so that to 
control for the perceptual rating factor.  
Because of a low number of trials for the 25% contrast – rating 3 and 75% contrast – 
rating 0 combinations, comparisons between perceptual ratings 0, 1 and 2 included 
trials with contrasts corresponding to 25% and 50% detection thresholds; comparisons 
between perceptual ratings 1, 2 and 3 included trials with contrasts corresponding to 
50% and 75% detection thresholds. For the same reason, the comparison between 
50 
 
contrasts 25% and 50% only included ratings of 0, 1 and 2 and the comparison between 
contrasts 50% and 75% only included ratings of 1, 2 and 3 (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Trial sorting and comparisons. Left panel: comparisons performed to investigate the 
awareness effect. Different scores at the awareness scale were compared by including an equal 
number of trials for each contrast level. To compare rating 0 vs rating 1 vs rating 2, contrasts 
corresponding to 25% and 50% of detection threshold were included (left upper panel), 
whereas contrasts at 50% and 75% were considered to compare rating 1 vs rating 2 vs rating 
3 (left bottom panel). Right panel: comparisons performed to investigate the contrast effect. 
Contrasts were compared by equating the number of trial for each rating. Contrast levels 
corresponding to 25% and 50% of detection threshold included equal number of trials rated as  
0, 1 and 2 on the PAS (right upper panel), whereas 50% and 75% of detection threshold were 
compared including an equal number of trials with ratings 1, 2 and 3 (right bottom panel). 
 
The mean number of trials for each condition of each comparison is: 72.82 for 25% vs 
50% (contrasts), 66.82 for 50% vs 75% (contrasts), 48.55 for 0 vs 1 vs 2 (ratings) and 
44.55 for 1 vs 2 vs 3 (ratings). Finally, for each subject also the average of the catch 
trials was computed (mean number of trials: 186.18).  
 
2.7 Statistical Analysis 
 To evaluate the effectiveness of the experimental manipulations, two separate 
repeated-measures analyses of variance (ANOVA) were carried out on discrimination 
accuracy for trials sorted according to both perceptual rating (within-subject factor: 
PAS. 4 levels: PAS=0, PAS=1, PAS=2 and PAS=3) and contrast level (within-subject 
factor: Contrast. 3 levels: 25%, 50% and 75%). Indeed, if our manipulation was 
effective, we expect that accuracy increases as both the perceptual ratings and contrast 
levels increase. 
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To investigate the effect of different levels of visual awareness (rating 0 vs 1 vs 2; 
rating 1 vs 2 vs 3) and different contrast conditions (contrast 25% vs 50%; contrast 
50% vs 75%) on EEG data, non-parametric cluster-based permutation analyses were 
used (Maris and Oostenveld, 2007). For every sample (channel x time point), 
conditions were compared by means of a repeated-measures ANOVA (for rating 
comparison) or of a paired-samples T-Test (for contrast comparison), on a time 
window from 0 to 900 ms after stimulus presentation. Those samples whose F- or t-
value exceeded a critical value (p < 0.05) were selected and clustered according to 
spatial and temporal adjacency, then, within every cluster, F- or t-values were summed 
to calculate cluster-level statistics. The maximum cluster was thus used in the test 
statistics. These cluster-based statistics were evaluated through a non-parametric 
permutation analysis, which included 500 random sets of permutations. For each 
permutation, cluster-based statistics were calculated and a reference distribution was 
built, from which the Monte Carlo p-value was estimated according to the proportion 
of the randomization null distribution exceeding the maximum cluster statistic. When 
ANOVAs on the rating comparisons resulted significant, post-hoc analyses were 
performed through non-parametric cluster-based permutation t-tests between each 
rating condition. The paired-samples T-Tests were run on the mean amplitude of the 
significant time window identified by the main ANOVA. 
In order to ensure that the random selection of trials performed to equate the number 
of trials was not biasing the results, the trial sampling was repeated 500 times for each 
comparison and the statistical analyses were performed for each random draw. The p 
values obtained after each draw and statistical analysis were averaged together for each 
comparison, to confirm the significant effects.  
To further investigate the contribution of sensory stimulation, we compared EEG 
responses evoked by a different amount of physical information (different contrasts), 
but resulting in the same subjective report on the PAS. To this end, ERPs derived from 
trials corresponding to 25 and 50% detection threshold and rated as 1 on the PAS were 
compared to ERPs calculated as average signal of trials corresponding to 50 and 75% 
detection threshold and also rated as 1. The same comparison was repeated for rating 
2, comparing the average response at 25 and 50% versus the EEG response evoked by 
contrasts at 50 and 75% detection threshold (Fig. 2). For both comparisons, 500 paired-
samples t-test were run on the mean amplitude of a 350 – 450 ms time window of 
electrode Pz (the electrode that showed the largest effects).  
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Lastly, a cluster-based permutation t-test was performed on catch trials to test for a 
statistical difference from the baseline (-300 to 0 ms before stimulus onset). For every 
channel x time point sample, the comparison was run on a time window from 0 to 900 
ms after stimulus presentation. 
 
3. Results and Discussion 
3.1 Behavioural Results 
After the threshold assessment, the mean luminance value chosen was 0.0425% for 
25%, 0.0488% for 50% and 0.0569% for 75% detection threshold (lighter and darker 
stimuli collapsed together). For trials at 25% detection threshold, the mean percentage 
of PAS = 0 responses given by the participants was 55.09%, 25.32% for PAS = 1, 
14.45% for PAS = 2 and 5.14% for PAS = 3. For trials at 50% detection threshold, the 
mean percentage of PAS = 0 responses given by the participants was 36.05%, 26.45% 
for PAS = 1, 24.86% for PAS = 2 and 12.64% for PAS = 3. Finally, for trials at 75% 
detection threshold, the mean percentage of PAS = 0 responses given by the 
participants was 18.18%, 22.09% for PAS = 1, 30.68% for PAS = 2 and 29.05% for 
PAS = 3. The mean percentage of catch trials receiving a rating of 0 on the PAS was 
88.14% (sd = 17.47), thus revealing the reliability of the participants. For trials sorted 
according to the different visual awareness levels as rated by participants (PAS = 0, 
PAS = 1, PAS = 2, PAS = 3), the repeated-measures ANOVA conducted on the mean 
percentage of correct responses revealed that, as visual awareness increased, also 
accuracy significantly increased [Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F(1.688,16.882) = 
113.168, p < 0.01; linear trend F(1,10) = 1000.716, p < 0.01; Fig. 3A].  For trials sorted 
according to the different sensory stimulation levels (25%, 50%, 75%), the repeated-
measures ANOVA on accuracy showed that, as sensory information increased, also 
accuracy significantly increased [F(2,20) = 35.53, p < 0.01; linear trend F(1,10) = 
89.89, p < 0.01; Fig. 3B]. These results thus confirm that the experimental 
manipulations carried out (visual awareness and sensory evidence) were indeed 
effective. 
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Figure 3. Behavioral results. (A) Mean percentage of correct responses as a function of PAS 
rating. (B) Mean accuracy for each contrast level. Error bars represent standard errors and the 
solid line (50%) chance level. 
 
3.2 ERP Results 
To investigate the awareness and the sensory evidence effects, we performed a series 
of non-parametric cluster-based permutations ANOVAs and t-tests, after controlling 
for the orthogonal factor by randomly selecting and numerically equating trials within 
each experimental condition (see “Statistical Analysis” section for details). 
 
3.2.1 Awareness Rating 
 
1) PAS = 0 vs PAS = 1 vs PAS = 2 
For this analysis, trials at 25% and 50% detection threshold were used (Fig. 2). Visual 
inspection of the mean grand average ERPs obtained after 500 random selections of 
trials confirmed the presence of a positive deflection, compatible with the P300 
component, starting around 250 ms after stimulus onset (Fig. 4A). The non-parametric 
cluster-based permutation ANOVA, performed on a single sampling run, found a 
significant positive cluster over centro-parietal and frontal electrodes, on an interval 
from 264 to 848 ms after stimulus onset (pcluster < 0.01). Post-hoc comparisons between 
each awareness level, performed through cluster-based permutation t-tests averaging 
over the significant time window identified in the main analysis (264 - 848 ms), 
showed that each condition was significantly different from the others. Specifically, 
the comparison between PAS = 1 and PAS = 0 identified a significant positive cluster 
of centro-parietal electrodes and a significant negative cluster on frontal areas (all 
pscluster < 0.01; Fig. 4B). The comparison between PAS = 2 and PAS = 1 found the 
same positive and negative clusters at centro-parietal and frontal electrodes, 
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respectively (all pscluster < 0.01; Fig. 4C). Finally, the comparison between PAS = 2 
and PAS = 0 found the positive centro-parietal and the negative frontal clusters (all 
pscluster < 0.01; Fig. 4D). After repeating the random selection and the cluster analyses 
500 times, the presence of the two clusters was confirmed: the positive centro-parietal 
cluster of electrodes remained significant from around 400 to 700 ms after stimulus 
onset, while the negative cluster resulted to be significant from around 520 to 670 ms, 
as shown by the topography of the averaged p-values (Fig. 4E) and the number of 
times out of 500 that centro-parietal electrodes resulted significant (Fig. 4F). Overall, 
these results show that the P300 is modulated by the level of visual awareness as rated 
by the participants, with higher amplitudes corresponding to higher quality in the 
perceptual experience. 
 
Figure 4. Effect of rating on P300 amplitude (PAS=0 vs PAS=1 vs PAS=2). (A) Mean grand 
average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each PAS category after 500 random 
draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at each time point. (B) Post-hoc comparison 
between PAS=1 and PAS=0. (C) Post-hoc comparison between PAS=2 and PAS=1. (D) Post-
hoc comparison between PAS=2 and PAS=0. Black dots represent a significant positive 
cluster, whereas white dots represent a significant negative cluster. (E) Topography of the 
averaged p-values over 500 random draws from 400 to 700 ms after stimulus onset, the time 
window where the most consistent effect was found, i.e. when the majority of electrodes 
showed a significant difference between conditions 500 times out of 500 cluster-based 
ANOVAs. (F) Sum of the significant effects at centro-parietal electrodes after 500 random 
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draws at 400 ms after stimulus onset, when the effect (significant difference between rating 
conditions after 500 random draws) was maximum. 
 
2) PAS = 1 vs PAS = 2 vs PAS = 3 
For this analysis, trials at 50% and 75% detection threshold were used (Fig. 2). Again, 
visual inspection of the mean grand average ERPs obtained after 500 random 
selections of trials showed the presence of a positive P300 component, starting around 
250 ms after stimulus presentation (Fig. 5A). The non-parametric cluster-based 
permutation ANOVA, performed on a single sampling run, found a significant cluster 
of centro-parietal electrodes from 228 to 696 ms after stimulation (pcluster < 0.01). Post-
hoc comparisons between each PAS rating, performed through cluster-based 
permutation t-tests on the mean amplitude of the significant time window (228 - 696 
ms), resulted in significant differences between each awareness condition. The 
comparison between PAS = 2 and PAS = 1 found a significant difference in a positive 
centro-parietal cluster of electrodes (pcluster < 0.01; Fig. 5B). Also the comparison 
between PAS = 3 and PAS = 2 identified a significant positive cluster over centro-
parietal areas (pcluster < 0.01; Fig. 5C). Lastly, the comparison between PAS = 3 and 
PAS = 1 identified a significant positive centro-parietal cluster (pcluster < 0.01) and a 
significant negative left frontal cluster of electrodes (pcluster < 0.05; Fig. 5D). The 
random sampling performed 500 times and the following ANOVAs confirmed the 
presence of the positive centro-parietal cluster of electrodes, from around 270 to 470 
ms after stimulus onset, as shown by the topography of the averaged p-values (Fig. 
5E) and the number of times out of 500 that centro-parietal electrodes resulted 
significant (Fig. 5F). In line with the previous comparison, the amplitude of the 
positive deflection increased as a function of visual awareness. 
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Figure 5. Effect of rating on P300 amplitude (PAS=1 vs PAS=2 vs PAS=3). (A) Mean grand 
average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each PAS category after 500 random 
draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at each time point. (B) Post-hoc comparison 
between PAS=1 and PAS=2. (C) Post-hoc comparison between PAS=3 and PAS=2. (D) Post-
hoc comparison between PAS=3 and PAS=1. Black dots represent a significant positive 
cluster, whereas white dots represent a significant negative cluster. (E) Topography of the 
averaged p-values over 500 random draws from 320 to 420 ms after stimulus onset, the time 
window where the most consistent effect was found, i.e. when the majority of electrodes 
showed a significant difference between conditions 500 times out of 500 cluster-based 
ANOVAs. (F) Sum of the significant effects at centro-parietal electrodes after 500 random 
draws at 400 ms after stimulus onset, when the effect (significant difference between rating 
conditions after 500 random draws) was maximum. 
 
3.2.2 Sensory Stimulation 
 
1) 25% Contrast vs 50% Contrast 
For this analysis, trials rated as 0, 1 and 2 on the PAS were used (Fig. 2). Visual 
inspection of the mean grand average ERPs obtained after 500 random selections of 
trials confirmed the presence of a positive deflection, compatible with the P300 
component, starting around 250 ms after stimulation (Fig. 6). The non-parametric 
cluster-based permutation t-test, performed on a single sampling run, did not find any 
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significant cluster of electrodes (all pscluster > 0.05) when comparing the two contrasts. 
The absence of any effect was confirmed after running the random sampling and the 
analyses 500 times. The P300, albeit present, was thus not modulated by the different 
levels of sensory stimulation provided. 
 
Figure 6. Mean grand average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each contrast level 
after 500 random draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at each time point. 
 
2) 50% Contrast vs 75% Contrast 
For this analysis, trials rated as 1, 2 and 3 on the PAS were used (Fig. 2). Again, visual 
inspection of the mean grand average ERPs obtained after 500 random selections of 
trials showed the presence of a positive P300-like component, starting around 250 ms 
after stimulus presentation (Fig. 7). The non-parametric cluster-based permutation t-
test, performed on a single sampling run, did not identify any significant cluster of 
electrodes (all pscluster > 0.05) for the difference between the two contrast conditions. 
The 500 random samplings and analyses confirmed the absence of the effect, so there 
is no modulation of the amplitude of the component as a function of increasing sensory 
stimulation. 
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Figure 7. Mean grand average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each contrast level 
after 500 random draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at each time point. 
 
3.2.3 Differences between same Ratings 
The contribution of sensory stimulation was further investigated by comparing EEG 
signal associated with the same subjective report on the PAS, but different amounts of 
physical information (contrasts). 
 
1) Rating 1 
For this analysis, trials rated 1 on the PAS were used (Fig. 2). Trials at 25% and 50% 
were collapsed and compared to the average of contrast conditions at 50%+75% (Fig. 
8). Out of 500 paired-samples t-tests on the mean amplitude of electrode Pz, within a 
time window from 350 to 450 ms, 61 tests resulted to be significant. Since the number 
of significant tests did not reach the confidence interval of 95%, the effects found can 
thus be considered random, meaning that sensory stimulation does not contribute to 
the modulation of the P300 component. 
 
Figure 8. Mean grand average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each rating 1 
(25+50% and 50+75%) after 500 random draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at 
each time point. 
 
2) Rating 2 
For this analysis, trials rated 2 on the PAS were used (Fig. 2) and the statistical analysis 
was performed to compare the average signal evoked by trials at 25% and 50% to the 
average of 50% and 75% sensory level (Fig. 9). The 500 paired-samples t-tests, on the 
mean amplitude of electrode Pz from 350 to 450 ms, resulted to be significant 36 times. 
Again, since the number of significant tests did not exceed the 95% confidence 
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interval, the effect can be considered null, confirming the results found for the 
comparison of the two rating 1. 
 
Figure 9. Mean grand average ERP waves over electrode Pz, obtained for each rating 2 
(25+50% and 50+75%) after 500 random draws. Shaded areas represent standard errors at 
each time point. 
 
3.2.4 Catch trials 
The cluster-based permutation t-test performed on the whole epoch (0 to 900 ms) 
between ERP amplitude evoked by catch trials (Fig. 10A) and pre-stimulus (-300 to 0 
ms) baseline interval, revealed two significant clusters of electrodes (Fig. 10B). The 
first cluster was a positive cluster over centro-parietal areas (pcluster < 0.01, starting at 
248 ms until the end of the epoch), and the second was a negative cluster on frontal 
channels (pcluster < 0.05, from 296 ms until the end of the epoch). These results thus 
show that even if no sensory stimulation was provided, the centro-parietal component 
is still present. Since in the case of catch trial no sensory stimulation can be 
accumulated, this finding may support the hypothesis that instead an accumulation of 
internal evidence takes place, regardless of the presence of the actual physical 
stimulus. 
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Figure 10. Catch trials. (A) Visual comparison between mean grand average ERP waves of 
PAS=0 (obtained after 500 random draws from 25+50% trials) and grand average ERPs of 
catch trials over electrode Pz. Shaded areas of PAS=0 ERPs represent standard errors at each 
time point. (B) Comparison between catch trials and pre-stimulus baseline interval. Black dots 
represent a significant positive cluster, whereas white dots represent a significant negative 
cluster. 
 
4. General Discussion 
The aim of the present study was to evaluate the contribution of both physical 
stimulation and subjective rating of visual awareness in perceptual decision-making 
tasks. In standard conditions, sensory evidence and visual awareness proceed together 
and are thus confounded, with higher levels of visual awareness elicited by stronger 
stimulation, so that it is difficult to disentangle their unique contribution when coming 
to a decision. Crucially, our experimental manipulations allowed us to investigate each 
process (sensory evidence and visual awareness) alone. Participants had to 
discriminate stimuli at different levels of sensory evidence and rate the quality of their 
visual experience on the graded Perceptual Awareness Scale (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 
2004). The P300, a component that has been related to both accumulation of sensory 
evidence (O’Connell et al., 2012) and access to the phenomenal content of a given 
perception (Del Cul et al., 2007), resulted to be modulated only by the level of visual 
awareness rated by the participants, and did not depend on the actual strength of the 
stimulation provided, as also confirmed in the case of catch trials.  
These results thus provide further evidence in favor of the contribution of endogenous 
fluctuations in decision formation. In fact, previous studies (Kelly and O’Connell, 
2013; Twomey et al., 2015; Loughnane et al., 2016) assessed the impact of internal 
variations on decision-making by analyzing reaction times (RTs). Sorting trials 
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according to RTs (from slower to faster) within each sensory level revealed how the 
build-up rate of the P300 increased as a function of speed, i.e. steeper build-up rates 
of the P300 were associated with faster RTs. Moreover, this endogenous variability 
was explained by attentional fluctuations in pre-stimulus parieto-occipital α power 
(Kelly and O’Connell, 2013). The problem with RTs is that they also represent a 
confound, since they can both reflect the ease of sensory evidence accumulation and 
the speed of conscious access, thus being an indirect measure of the actual perception 
of the stimuli. On the contrary, asking the participants to rate the level of visual 
awareness provides a direct subjective measure of perceptual variability within the 
same level of physical stimulation. 
A previous study (de Lange et al., 2011) tried to investigate the effect of visual 
awareness on sensory evidence accumulation. In their research, through masking, the 
authors presented a sequence of high and low visibility stimuli, without asking the 
participants to judge their perceptual experience. They found that, despite the 
accumulation of sensory evidence was possible even in the absence of visual 
awareness, there were qualitative differences in evidence accumulation that instead 
depended on the higher or lower visibility of the stimuli. At the neural level, these 
qualitative differences were reflected in an early (~50 ms) frontal top-down biasing 
effect, present only for highly visible material: in series of high visibility trials 
evidence is rapidly accumulated to the decision bound, so that there is no need of 
further accumulation once this bound is reached. A similar top-down effect was 
previously found by the same group (de Lange et al., 2010) at a later latency (~200-
300 ms) over centro-parietal areas, where changes in neural activity were inversely 
correlated to the amount of accumulated sensory evidence, suggesting that the more 
the sensory evidence collected, the fewer the resources deployed to process further 
information. However, in our electrophysiological data, we seem to observe a 
quantitative more than a qualitative difference in evidence accumulation. In fact, the 
P300 component is always present with the same centro-parietal topography for trials 
at the different contrast levels, at the different awareness levels and also in catch trials, 
with amplitude modulations that are related only to the subjective experience rated by 
the participants on the PAS (Ramsøy and Overgaard, 2004). The latency of the effect 
(from ~300 ms) can also suggest that trying to access perceptual information might 
represent a top-down post-stimulus endogenous process, that is decoupled from 
exogenous factors (as revealed by the presence of the effect also in catch trials). It is 
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thus a top-down process related to the read-out of the perceptual information (be it 
present or not), and hence different from the biasing effect found by de Lange and 
colleagues, where there is a strategic modulation in information acquisition 
exclusively depending on the strength of the sensory stimulation initially provided 
(2011) or accumulated across time (2010). This post-stimulus endogenous process 
might also be different from another post-sensory process identified around 300 ms 
(Philiastides et al., 2006). The component found by these authors is stronger with 
higher sensory evidence and its presence is strictly task-related, so it has been proposed 
to represent the evidence that actually goes through the decision-making process. 
Anyway, again, the fact that in our study we found a P300 also when processing catch 
trials does not allow us to interpret the reflected process in the same way as Philiastides 
and collaborators (2006), but it might be better described as access to the internal 
evidence. Another confirm that the P300 reflects access to the evidence might be found 
in a work of Melloni and colleagues (2011). When assessing the modulation of 
expectations on the correlates of visual awareness, the amplitude of the P300 appeared 
to be larger for more visible stimuli than for less visible trials, but only when such 
stimuli were presented in an ascending sequence of six increasing contrast levels, and 
not when the sequence was descending. The results thus suggest that the effect was 
observed when perception relied on sensory stimulation, again pointing to a sort of 
top-down post-stimulus process that is about the search and the read-out of the 
evidence, not based on prior established expectations. 
The P300 found in our experiment is also different from a mere decision variable 
(Shadlen and Kiani, 2013), since we did not observe the component to reach a common 
boundary as in the experiments conducted by O’Connell’s group (O’Connell et al., 
2012; Kelly and O’Connell, 2013; Twomey et al., 2015; Loughnane et al., 2016). The 
amplitude of the component continued to be modulated by visual awareness and 
exhibited larger peaks for higher awareness levels, differently from the decision 
variable identified by O’Connell and collaborators that reaches at different latencies a 
fixed amplitude for all levels of sensory stimulation. The same continuous modulation 
was shown also in other studies (Philiastides et al., 2006; Philiastides et al., 2014) and 
the authors suggested that the reaching of a fixed amplitude might be due to the 
complex nature of the task employed by O’Connell’s group, where more cognitive 
resources are required and mixed together, thus leading to a common amplitude 
boundary. 
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Taken together, our results suggest that the P300 better reflects the so-called access 
consciousness (Block, 2005), a higher order process that allows the later manipulation 
of the content of a perceptual experience by a wide range of output systems. Access 
consciousness can thus be thought as a transitional stage between sensory stimulation 
and decision making, where the evidence and, importantly, also the absence of it, is 
read out to be the input of further processing. The finding that the amplitude of the 
P300 is modulated by the subjective ratings of visual awareness, and not by the 
different amounts of physical stimulation, might support the hypothesis that such a 
signal is not totally determined by the strength of the sensory evidence (Kelly and 
O’Connell, 2013). Rather, according to the two-stage decision-making model 
(Carpenter et al., 2009), this electrophysiological component reflects the quantitative 
differences in the accumulation of both sensory evidence and, crucially, also stimulus-
independent neural noise, that is produced within the brain itself. As a consequence, 
the accumulation of evidence deriving from both exogenous and endogenous factors 
then leads to the observed behavioral variability. 
  
64 
 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
In the debate on the graded vs. dichotomous nature of visual awareness (Ramsøy and 
Overgaard, 2004), we were able to provide some evidence that electrophysiological 
signatures related to conscious visual perception, the VAN (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 
2003) and the LP (Del Cul et al., 2007), showed an amplitude linear modulation as a 
function of visual awareness, rated by subjects on a graded scale. In addition, we saw 
that the phenomenal content of perception (as reflected in the VAN) was generated in 
an early time window in temporal, and not occipital, cortical areas, suggesting that 
conscious visual perception takes place outside the primary visual cortex (Zeki and 
ffytche, 1998).  
These results were confirmed when the same paradigm was employed with a 
hemianopic patient exhibiting degraded conscious vision (Mazzi et al., 2016). The 
patient could report some degrees of awareness for stimuli presented in her blind 
hemifield. Moreover, the electrophysiological data (both the VAN and the LP) 
correlated with her behavioral performance and were modulated by the level of 
awareness, suggesting that ERP analysis might be a helpful instrument in assessing 
blindsight versus degraded conscious vision patients. Visual stimuli in the blind visual 
field could thus elicit brain responses in the damaged hemisphere, suggesting again 
that residual awareness might occur regardless of V1 effective functionality. 
Finally, a further investigation was carried out to better characterize the post-
perceptual processes that are reflected in the LP, considered by different lines of 
research both as access consciousness (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010) and as sensory 
evidence accumulation (O’Connell et al., 2012). Our findings revealed that the 
amplitude of the component was modulated by the level of awareness, and not by the 
actual physical stimulation. These results thus highlight the importance of internal 
representations in the process that leads to decision-making: what takes place is an 
accumulation of both noise coming with the sensory input and, more importantly, of 
noise that is generated within the brain itself. 
Taken together, our experimental manipulations confirmed the existence at the neural 
level of two different properties, previously proposed by Block (2005), that 
characterize visual awareness: phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. 
Even if it is not clear yet whether V1 directly or indirectly contributes to visual 
awareness and there is still an ongoing debate on the anatomical correlates of both 
phenomenal and access consciousness, converging studies (see Koch et al., 2016 for a 
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recent review) pointed to a restricted localization in a so-called “temporo-parietal-
occipital hot zone”, especially for content consciousness. So, specific perceptual 
experiences might happen without an amplification coming from a fronto-parietal 
network (Dehaene, 2014), that might be instead responsible of attention allocation and 
task monitoring and reporting. 
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